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Glossary of terms
Anticipation effect A response to a policy change by an individual that occurs 
before they are actually affected by it.
Attenuation bias A bias that reduces the magnitude of estimated policy effects, 
usually caused by measurement error.
Common trends A necessary assumption for the difference-in-difference 
(DiD) estimator to be valid – requires that outcomes in the 
treatment and comparison groups would change by the same 
amount in the absence of any policy change.
Comparison group In DID analysis, a set of individuals who are not directly 
affected by the policy change under consideration, and whose 
outcomes are used to estimate the change in outcomes that 
would have occurred for the treatment group had the policy 
change not taken place.
Dynamic selection bias Bias that arises when examining the effects of a policy on 
an outcome that is only measured for those who make 
a transition and the likelihood of making the transition is 
affected by the policy.
External validity External validity refers to the extent to which that estimate 
can be generalised to other populations or time periods.
General equilibrium effects Effects of a policy on those who are not directly affected, for 
example through changes to wages and prices in the whole 
economy.
Intention to treat A variable which describes the average effect of a policy on 
all those who are meant to be affected by it rather than all 
those who actually are, acknowledging that some individuals 
will choose not to take advantage of the policy or will be 
overlooked (because of administrative mistakes).
Internal validity Internal validity refers to the ability of a research design to 
deliver a good estimate of the effect in question.
Longitudinal data Panel data, where individuals or households are followed over 
a period of time.
Roll-out The period between November 2008 and January 2011 during 
which the oldest age of youngest child consistent with being 
eligible to Income Support (IS) as a lone parent will fall from 
16 to seven.
P45/P46 Forms sent to Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) when 
an individual leaves or starts a job.
xii Glossary of terms
Steady-state The period after January 2011, when IS eligibility for lone 
parents will have reduced to those with a youngest child  
aged seven. The Government has announced this age will 
reduce to five from 2012.
Treated Used to describe individuals who are directly affected by the 
policy intervention being considered.
Treatment group Set of individuals directly affected by the policy change under 
consideration.
Untreated Used to describe individuals who are not directly affected by 
the policy intervention being considered.
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Summary
This report investigates the feasibility of undertaking an impact assessment of the policy change 
known as ‘Lone Parent Obligations and New Services for Lone Parents’ (together called ‘lone parent 
policy change’, or LPPC). 
Any impact assessment of the LPPC will have to overcome many difficulties. Some of these are 
due to its design: the policy was rolled out quickly in a uniform way across the country. Some of 
these reflect its timing: it was rolled out during a recession, and there has not been a comparable 
recession for over 15 years. Some of these reflect the wider policy environment: other policy changes 
have happened or are planned which have affected or will affect lone parents receiving Income 
Support (IS). However, the researchers’ assessment is that an impact assessment for some groups 
of affected clients and for the main benefit and employment outcomes is, in principle, feasible 
using the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, although any DiD estimator is always subject to 
a number of untestable assumptions. It also seems unlikely that the DiD approach could reliably 
detect small impacts (less than two percentage points). 
Key implications of the design of the lone parent policy change for an 
impact assessment (Chapter 2)
The date at which a lone parent will cease to be eligible to IS will depend on whether they are 
already claiming, the date of birth of their youngest child, and the date of their Work Focused 
Interviews (WFIs), but in a predictable manner with virtually no personal adviser discretion. This 
predictability is of great help when designing an impact assessment.
Lone parents will be offered additional support to move closer to the labour market during the 12 
months before they lose entitlement to IS as a lone parent. Those entering work will also receive 
additional support. These changes are part of the LPPC. For this reason, and to allow for anticipation 
effects in response to the impending loss of entitlement to IS, the date on which the policy first 
affects a lone parent should be considered to be at least 12 months before the loss of their 
entitlement to IS. A variant in which the policy is assumed to affect lone parents 24 months before 
they lose IS entitlement should be considered; this will be particularly important in the steady-
state, when lone parents will have known about the LPPC for a long time. The drawback is that this 
increases the differences in ages of the children in the treatment and comparison groups.
Empirical methods and comparison groups (Chapters 3 and 4)
The recommended empirical strategy is to use a DiD approach. This will compare the outcomes of 
lone parents directly affected by the LPPC with those of lone parents whose children are sufficiently 
young so that they are not affected; this comparison will then be itself compared to the difference 
in outcomes of similar groups of lone parents observed before the LPPCs. The idea is that differences 
in outcomes of lone parents with differently-aged youngest children before the LPPC begins are 
informative about what the differences in outcomes of lone parents with differently-aged youngest 
children would have been in the absence of the LPPC.
The key assumption needed for a DiD estimate to be valid is known as the ‘common trends’ 
assumption. In the case of the LPPC, common trends would fail if the labour market behaviour 
of lone parents with younger children changed in a way which was different from the change in 
the labour market behaviour of lone parents with older children. There is some evidence that the 
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‘common trends’ assumption did not hold during the period from 2001 to 2007. But the divergences 
are usually small, and may not be statistically significant, and they could be accounted for by using 
a trend-adjusted DiD model. However, even if this assumption holds in the pre-programme period, 
there is no guarantee that it will still hold after the LPPC is introduced. A particular concern for this 
impact assessment (IA) is that the LPPC is being implemented during a recession, and there is no 
pre-programme data to test whether common trends held during previous recessions. Over and 
above this, though, the main threats to the DiD approach are anticipation effects, and the impact of 
other contemporaneous policy changes.
Some outcomes, such as the duration on benefit and the number of lone parents starting work, 
could be examined using either a conventional linear DiD regression or a duration model. However, a 
DiD estimator cannot be used to estimate the effect of the LPPC on work-contingent outcomes such 
as job duration or earnings (were suitable data available) due to the dynamic selection bias problem 
discussed in Section 3.4. A duration model is required to examine these outcomes. 
Naïve analysis using the DiD method often produces estimated standard errors which are too 
small, and the conventional ways of addressing these (with clustered standard errors) may not be 
appropriate in the particular case of the LPPC. An eventual impact assessment should examine the 
ways in which standard errors can be estimated correctly in this situation, but it should be noted 
that these methods are at the cutting-edge of modern econometrics and the literature has not yet 
come to a consensus. The overall assessment of the research team is that, if the actual impact of 
LPPC is expected to be smaller than two percentage points, then it seems unlikely that such impacts 
could be detected reliably. But if an eventual IA is intended to test whether the LPPC had impacts as 
large as five to ten percentage points (compared with no effect), then a DiD or a trend-adjusted DiD 
model should provide robust answers.
There is a three-way trade-off between examining outcomes for a longer period of time, allowing 
for longer anticipation effects, and reducing the difference between the treatment and comparison 
groups in terms of the age of the youngest child. For some of the early phases of the roll-out, the 
difference in ages of the treatment and comparison groups will be large. A small difference in ages is 
desirable to make the common trends assumption more plausible, but a larger difference is needed 
in order to ensure that the comparison group is completely unaffected by the programme. 
There is a 27 month ‘roll-out’ period between November 2008 and January 2011 before the policy 
reaches a steady-state1. There are different problems to contend with when examining the impact 
of the roll-out and the steady-state policy. On balance, the internal validity of estimates based on 
the roll-out is probably higher than those based on the steady-state, but estimates of the roll-out 
of the LPPC may be different from (and therefore, a poor guide to) estimates based on the steady-
state. Whether these represent significant disadvantages depends on whether there is interest in 
understanding the impact of the roll-out in itself, rather than merely using the estimates from the 
roll-out as a guide to the likely impact of the steady-state policy. For example, the roll-out provides 
the only opportunity to estimate the impact of the LPPCs on lone parents whose youngest child is 
aged ten or more.
No quantitative method could robustly separate the overall impact of the LPPC into that due to 
‘anticipation effects’, ‘support’ effects and ‘after effects’, or separate the different elements of the 
support package, even were additional data available in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS). Any IA of the LPPC would give an estimate of the effect of the whole of the LPPC.
1 Since undertaking the feasibility study, the Government has announced that lone parents with 
a youngest child aged five and over will lose eligibility to IS from 2012.
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Data and outcomes (Chapter 5)
Two groups of lone parents will be directly affected by the LPPC: those receiving IS, who will lose 
entitlement to it sooner than they would have done otherwise, and those who will no longer 
be entitled to claim IS. Furthermore, all may be affected by general equilibrium effects, such as 
substitution, displacement or other spillover effects. 
For the first group, administrative data (the WPLS) can be used to measure outcomes relating to 
benefits and, if tax credit data in the WPLS is of sufficient quality, work outcomes. If information on 
earnings and tax credit payments were made available within the WPLS, then administrative data 
could be used to partially estimate the effect of the LPPC on family income. However, this would  
not allow researchers to estimate the impact of the LPPC on child poverty, as currently defined by 
the Government.
It may be possible to use the WPLS to estimate the impact of the LPPC – including so-called 
deterrent effects – on repeat claimants, but cannot, through its nature, be used to estimate the 
impact of deterrent effects on new customers. 
The impact of the LPPC on benefit, work, income and poverty outcomes could also be measured 
using household surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Family Resources Survey (FRS),  
if administrative data on these was of low quality or unavailable. However, small sample sizes would 
mean that impacts would be estimated imprecisely, and it would be unlikely that one could be 
confident that the LPPC had had any impact at all. 
It will not be possible for an IA to separate out the effects of the different elements of the LPPC, 
or examine displacement or substitution effects on the population as a whole. This is because of 
methodological barriers rather than inadequacies of the available data. 
Potential confounding factors (Chapter 6)
There are several potential confounding factors that could affect various parts of an eventual IA. 
Most of these can be dealt with within a DiD or duration model, although there are drawbacks, and 
it is possible that future developments in policy affecting lone parents could derail the proposed 
strategy totally.
Anticipation effects can be dealt with by changing the effective start date of the programme in the 
model. The drawback is that this increases the differences in ages of the children in the treatment 
and comparison groups, making the ‘common trends’ assumption underlying the DiD approach less 
plausible. 
Other policy changes affecting lone parents on IS and Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) have been 
introduced since 2008. Most of these can be controlled for relatively easily by introducing additional 
explanatory variables which identify those lone parents who are affected. By accounting for many 
of these policy changes, the eventual IA of the LPPC will also provide estimates (based on DiD) 
of the impact of these policies on lone parents on IS. However, some programmes that affect all 
lone parents cannot be controlled for in this way: any IA would have to assume that lone parents 
are affected by the same amount by these reforms (which would mean that any impact of these 
reforms are incorporated in the ‘common’ trend affecting all lone parents).
4 Summary
Some likely future policy changes – such as the introduction of the Work Programme – will have 
more significant implications for an eventual IA: the Work Programme will, in principle, change the 
nature of the policy regime for lone parents on JSA, and an extension of the LPPC to lone parents 
with younger children will directly affect the proposed comparison group. The most robust option 
would be to stop examining data when the Work Programme starts or LPPC is extended to more 
lone parents, but this would curtail the ability of an eventual IA to examine the medium- to long-
run impact of LPPC on lone parents with children aged over seven. An alternative approach that 
deals with the Work Programme would be to estimate separate impacts of LPPC before and after 
the Work Programme. Alternative approaches that deal with the extension of LPPC would be to use 
lone parents with children aged under three as the comparison group, or to flip the definition of the 
treatment group and comparison group, using the lone parents whose youngest child is aged seven 
or over to estimate the impact of the LPPC on those whose youngest child is aged five to seven.
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1 Introduction
From November 2008, additional obligations have been placed on lone parents claiming Income 
Support (IS), and new services have been offered. This report investigates the feasibility of 
estimating the net impact of these changes, hereafter referred to as ‘an impact assessment’ (IA). 
An IA would form part of the the Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) overall evaluation 
programme on the effects of Lone Parent Obligations (LPO). This consists of a mixed methods 
approach including in-depth interviews with customers and staff, a large-scale survey of customers, 
and analysis of in-house and other data sources to assess the impact of the changes. 
The overall aim of the evaluation is:
‘To	explore	the	extent	to	which	lone	parent	employment	interventions	provide	an	effective	
incentive	to	look	for	paid	employment,	alongside	an	effective	package	of	support	for	workless	
lone	parents	to	enable	them	to	find,	enter	and	sustain	paid	employment.’	
The starting point for this study was that an impact assessment should cover as wide a range of 
outcomes as possible, and should assess short- and medium-run outcomes (where medium-run is 
defined as up to four years after a lone parent’s IS has ended), and this study shows to what extent 
such a wide-ranging impact assessment is or is not feasible. But just because something is feasible 
does not mean that it should be carried out: all research has costs, as well as benefits, and it takes 
time before one can estimate the impact of a policy on medium-run outcomes. 
This report is arranged as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the policy change, and discusses the 
populations of interest. Chapter 3 discusses what methods could be used to estimate the impact of 
the lone parent policy change (LPPC). It argues why a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, using 
lone parents with younger children as a comparison group, is an attractive method to evaluate the 
impact of the LPPC, and it provides evidence (from so-called pre-programme or placebo tests) on the 
suitability of such an approach; inevitably, some of the material in this chapter is technical in nature. 
Chapter 4 discusses some detailed refinements to the suggested empirical approach. Chapter 5 
discusses the datasets that are likely to be of use, and what outcomes could be investigated in 
an eventual IA. Chapter 6 discusses a number of confounding or complicating factors. Chapter 7 
concludes.
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2 What is the policy change  
 and what groups are of  
 interest?
This chapter provides details of the policy changes that are part of the lone parent policy change 
(LPPC) (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), and discusses what groups in the population will be of interest to the 
eventual impact assessment (IA) (Section 2.3).
2.1 What is the policy change?
The key policy change, considered by this feasibility study, is that lone parents with a youngest child 
aged seven or over will no longer be entitled to claim Income Support (IS) solely on the grounds 
of being a lone parent.2 A small minority of lone parents will be able to claim IS on other grounds, 
but the intention is that those lone parents who are able to work may claim Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA), and those with a health problem or disability may be able to claim Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA). In addition to this, changes were made to the pre-employment support provided 
in the 12 months leading up to the date when entitlement to IS as a lone parent is removed, and 
increased post-employment support was introduced. These changes together are referred to as the 
LPPC. 
Other policy changes also came into effect between 2008 and 2010 which affected lone parents 
receiving benefits. The main ones are:
• the introduction of ESA;
• changes to the JSA regime with the introduction of the Flexible New Deal (FND).
There are also likely to be policy changes in the future, such as the introduction of the Work 
Programme. These other policies, and their effect on a possible IA, are discussed in Section 6.2. The 
rest of this chapter gives more detail about the policies which form part of the LPPC, and therefore, 
fall within the scope of the impact assessment:
2.1.1 Withdrawal of eligibility to IS for lone parents with older children
Before November 2008, lone parents could claim IS until their youngest child reached 16. That age 
cut-off is gradually falling over a three-year period. In general terms, eligibility to claim IS on the 
grounds of being a lone parent was, or will be, withdrawn at the following times:
• for new and repeat claims by lone parents with a youngest child aged:
– 12 or over, from November 2008;
– ten or over, from October 2009;
– seven or over, from October 2010;
2 The Government announced in June 2010 plans to extend Lone Parent Obligations (LPO) to 
lone parents whose youngest child is aged five and six. Such a change would require primary 
legislation, and so the implications for this for an eventual IA are discussed in Chapter 5.
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• for lone parents already receiving IS (referred to by DWP as ‘existing customers’) with a youngest 
children aged:
– 14 or over, March to May 2009;
– 12 or over, July to December 2009;
– 11 or over, February to April 2010;
– ten or over, June to October 2010;
– nine or over, November 2010 to October 2011;
– seven or over, from January 2011.
This report refers to the period between November 2008 and January 2011 as the ‘roll-out period’, 
and after January 2011 as the ‘steady-state’. The possible extension of LPO to lone parents whose 
children are aged five and six is discussed in Chapter 6.
The date at which lone parents already receiving IS cease to be eligible may also depend on the date 
of birth of their youngest child (different cohorts were or will be treated differently in some cases) 
and the date of their Work Focused Interview (WFI). Appendix C outlines in more detail when lone 
parents already receiving IS cease or ceased to be eligible, and Section 5.5 discusses how accurately 
one can replicate the date on which a lone parent lost their IS entitlement using the administrative 
data in the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS).
Some lone parents are not be affected by these changes, even if their youngest child is older than 
indicated in the list above. Lone parents who have other reasons for claiming IS (than being a 
lone parent) – for example, those who have children for whom the middle or highest rate of care 
component of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) is payable, or those who claim Carer’s Allowance, or 
who are fostering children – continue to be eligible for IS.3 The implication of these groups for the 
eventual IA is discussed in Section 5.5. 
Having lost entitlement to claim IS as a lone parent, lone parents who are available to work will be 
entitled to claim JSA. Lone parents with a health problem or disability may be able to claim ESA. ESA 
is generally paid at the same rate as JSA during the assessment period. Afterwards, those placed in 
the Work Related Activity Group receive a work-related activity component in addition and those in 
the Support Group receive a support component in addition to the basic rate. 
2.1.2 Preparing for the transition from IS to JSA/ESA
To prepare lone parents for the loss of IS eligibility a number of initiatives are in place to give lone 
parents information about the changes and help lone parents move closer to the labour market. 
These are:
3 The main groups of lone parents who will continue to be eligible for IS after the LPPC are 
foster carers, lone parents who are in receipt of middle or higher rate care component DLA 
for a dependent child, lone parents who are in receipt of Carer’s Allowance, and lone parents 
who are full-time students at the point the IS entitlement changes come into force, who are 
transitionally protected for the duration of the course. Furthermore, those few lone parents 
who had been claiming IS continuously since before April 2004 and who were receiving child 
additions to IS rather than the Child Tax Credit (CTC) could have their eligibility extended for 
one period of four weeks if the CTC claim for the lone parent moving onto JSA had not been 
processed at the time of the voluntary interview six weeks before the original IS end date.
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2.1.3 Options and Choices events
These are group sessions designed to inform lone parents about the support available to them and 
the forthcoming changes to their benefit entitlement. 
2.1.4 Final Year Quarterly WFIs
Quarterly WFIs (QWFIs) now take place in the year before a lone parent loses eligibility to IS. 
Lone parents eligible for a QWFI are, or will be, those with a youngest child aged:
• 11 from 8 September 2008;
• ten to 11 from 1 February 2009;
• nine from 6 June 2009; 
• eight from 25 October 2009; and
• six to seven from 3 January 2010.
An exception to this was the set of lone parents whose youngest child was 12 on or before  
5 July 2009.
2.1.5 New in-work support
As part of the LPPC, additional support and guidance has been made available to lone parents 
moving into work. These are:
• national extension of In-Work Credit (IWC) (from April 2008);
• in one Jobcentre Plus district, there was a pilot scheme known as the In Work Retention Pilot that 
varied the frequency of IWC payments so that there are two lump sum payments towards the 
end of the 52 weeks. This took place between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2010;
• In-Work Advisory Support from Jobcentre Plus Advisers;
• the national roll-out of the In Work Emergency Discretionary Fund;
• piloting the provision of support for Up-Front Childcare Costs in London between 28 April 2008 and 
31 March 2010;
• Better-off in Work Credit, a payment that ensured that benefit claimants were at least £25 a week 
better of in full-time work than on an out-of-work benefit was piloted in one Jobcentre Plus region 
between October 2008 and October 2009 (although this should not be relevant for most lone 
parents on IS given the in-work support already available).
Some of these policies are not limited to lone parents affected by LPPC: they are, or were, also 
available to lone parents with younger children. As discussed in Section 6.2, the eventual IA will, 
therefore, need to account explicitly for these policies. 
2.2 When does the lone parent policy change begin for a  
 particular lone parent?
It should be stressed that, although the most important single date for a lone parent affected by the 
LPPC is the date on which they lose entitlement to IS as a lone parent, the eventual IA should not 
limit itself to examining how outcomes change only after that date. It is likely that the LPPC has an 
impact on lone parents’ behaviour at least a year before they lose IS entitlement, for two reasons:
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• First, the 12 months leading up to the loss of entitlement to IS as a lone parent is regarded as part 
of the LPPC, because that period sees lone parents facing a more intensive WFI regime, and most 
of the additional pre-employment support is concentrated in the final year of entitlement.
• Second, lone parents receiving IS may alter their behaviour in anticipation of losing their 
entitlement to IS in the near future. These changes are commonly referred to as ‘anticipation 
effects’, because the lone parent would be altering their behaviour because of something that will 
happen in the future. For example, a lone parent who considers that she will not be able to claim 
JSA indefinitely might decide to start work before she loses entitlement to IS if there is a risk that 
she might not be able to find such a good job offer later on when claiming JSA.
If there are anticipation effects, then considering only those lone parents who remained on IS 
until they lost entitlement would ignore some of the impacts of the LPPC. Furthermore, any impact 
assessment that attempted to estimate the effect of the LPPC by comparing outcomes before 
and after the reform would be biased if lone parents who leave IS in anticipation of the loss of IS 
entitlement were not representative of all lone parents affected by the LPPC. This is because in this 
case, differences between lone parents observed before and after the reform would reflect these 
compositional differences as well as the impact of the LPPC and wider economic trends. 
As discussed in Section 6.1, in general, anticipation effects can be dealt with in an IA by altering the 
date on which it is considered the policy change first applies. Given the nature of the LPPC, it would 
be natural to take this date as being 12 months before the loss of entitlement to IS. 
2.3 Who is the population of interest?
This section discusses the various groups which might be affected by the LPPC or which might be 
considered by the eventual IA. 
The main group of lone parents who might be directly affected by the LPPC are those already on IS, 
who will have their eligibility to receive IS as a lone parent removed earlier than it would otherwise 
have been (DWP refer to this group as ‘existing customers’).
It is expected that the LPPC encourages some lone parents already claiming IS to leave benefit 
(whether IS or JSA) earlier than they would otherwise. This could be for a number of reasons:
• lone parents receiving IS or JSA may look for work sooner than they otherwise would have in 
anticipation of, or in response to, the JSA regime, with its requirement to participate in job search 
and accept certain job offers;
• these same factors could also induce lone parents receiving IS or JSA to leave benefit but not start 
work, perhaps because they have re-partnered; 
• lone parents may find work more easily as a result of the new support being introduced in the run-
up to the withdrawal of eligibility to IS. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the LPPC does not begin to affect lone parents only when they lose their 
entitlement to IS. The 12 months leading up to the loss of entitlement to IS is part of the LPPC, as it 
will feature a more intense WFI regime, and additional pre-employment support, and there are likely 
to be anticipation effects to the imminent loss of entitlement to IS as a lone parent.
The LPPC may also improve subsequent work retention among lone parents in this group who do 
leave work for a job, for a number of reasons:
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• as a result of the additional in-work support provided during the first 26 weeks (or 52 weeks in the 
case of IWC) of work;
• because some lone parents are unable to claim JSA if they were to stop work (but would, in the 
absence of the LPPC, have been able to claim IS under the same circumstances). 
There are also some potential impacts which are not considered further in this study. 
First, as a result of the LPPC, some lone parents, depending on the date of birth (or age) of their 
youngest child, will be unable to claim IS. This will probably lead to them being less likely to be 
receiving any benefits at all – because not all of those who would have claimed IS in the absence of 
LPPC will be able to claim either JSA or ESA after the LPPC – and therefore, more likely to be in work 
or to re-partner. In fact, these impacts need not be confined to lone parents: some adults in couples 
with children, or some single women without children, for example, might alter their behaviour in 
the knowledge that they would not be able to claim IS as a lone parent. However, the implications of 
this for an eventual IA are not considered further in this report. 
Second, theoretically, the LPPC may encourage some lone parents currently not receiving an out-of-
work benefit to claim JSA in order to take advantage of the new opportunities for training available 
to claimants, or to take advantage of IWC, but the research team consider this extremely unlikely in 
practice. 
Third, all lone parents, and others in the population, might be affected by the LPPC through 
spillovers, displacement and other general equilibrium effects on wages and prices (discussed 
further in Section 4.3).
2.4 Summary
This chapter has outlined the key features of the policies that make up the LPPC. The most important 
points for the eventual IA are that:
• two groups of lone parents are directly affected by the LPPC: those receiving IS who lose 
entitlement to it sooner than they would have done otherwise, and those who are no longer 
entitled to claim IS. Furthermore, all may be affected by general equilibrium effects, such as 
substitution, displacement or other spillover effects;
• the date at which a lone parent will cease to be eligible to IS depends on whether they are already 
claiming IS, the date of birth of their youngest child, and the date of their WFIs, but it does so in a 
predictable manner with virtually no personal adviser discretion. This predictability is of great help 
when designing an impact assessment;
• lone parents are being offered additional support to move closer to the labour market during the 
12 months before they lose entitlement to IS as a lone parent, and those entering work are also 
receiving additional support. These changes are part of the LPPC and so the date on which the 
policy first affects a lone parent should be considered to be 12 months before the loss of their 
entitlement to IS; this will also allow for anticipation effects in response to the impending loss of 
entitlement to IS;
• other policy changes affecting lone parents have occurred since 2008, or will occur in the near 
future, and these will need to be accounted for in an eventual IA (discussed in Section 6.2);
• there is a long ‘roll-out’ period during which the age of youngest child cut-off is falling before the 
policy reaches a steady-state.
13The empirical approach
3 The empirical approach 
This chapter reviews the econometric methods that could be used in an impact assessment (IA).  
It is necessarily more technical than the other chapters.
Section 3.1 sets out a framework for thinking about how to choose an evaluation technique, and 
a comparison group. Section 3.2 outlines methods that were considered but rejected, Section 3.3 
argues why a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, using lone parents with younger children as a 
comparison group, is an attractive method to evaluate the impact of the lone parent policy change 
(LPPC), and Section 3.4 outlines in detail which cohorts of lone parents could act as comparison 
groups. With these recommendations in mind, Section 3.5 reports the results from tests designed 
to assess the suitability of DiDs with lone parents with younger children as a comparison group. This 
was done by testing whether the ‘common trends’ assumption holds in the period before the LPPC 
was introduced (this is sometimes known as a placebo test, or pre-programme test). 
The next chapter discusses some elaborations to the basic DiD approach, including what more can 
be gained by using a duration model, the advantages and disadvantages of evaluating the impact of 
the roll-out compared with the steady-state policy and why the IA will not be able to estimate the 
separate impact of the different elements of the LPPC.
3.1 Evaluation techniques and the role of the comparison group 
The goal of an IA is to determine how the outcomes of treated or affected individuals were altered 
by the policy or reform in question. That is, an IA tries to compare the treated and untreated 
outcomes of a particular group of individuals, in a particular time period. 
All empirical IA methods proceed by (implicitly or explicitly) contrasting the outcomes of the treated 
group to the outcomes of a suitably chosen comparison (or ‘control’ group). The key problem in 
an IA, which the comparison group is intended to solve, is that the counterfactual outcome of the 
treated group is not observed. For example, in evaluating the effect of LPPC, the outcomes of a 
group of lone parents who lose their entitlement to Income Support (IS) are observed (and receive 
a package of new services). What is not observed (and can never be observed) is the outcomes of 
exactly that group of lone parents in exactly that time period, had they not lost their entitlement to 
IS (and received a package of new services). 
The role of the comparison group in an IA, therefore, is to serve as a basis for estimating the 
unobserved, counterfactual outcomes of the treatment group. This is true even in research designs 
in which it is not entirely obvious. For example, in a simple-difference (or time-series) design, the 
outcomes of the treated group are compared to the outcomes of the same individuals in an earlier 
(pre-treatment) period. Here, the same individuals effectively form the treatment and comparison 
group, and past outcomes of these individuals are used to impute what their outcomes in the period 
of interest would have been in the absence of the treatment. In a parametric duration model, in 
which treatment status (exposure to the policy or reform) appears as an explanatory variable, 
a comparison is being made between individuals exposed to the treatment and individuals not 
exposed to the treatment (or perhaps between the same individuals in periods before and after 
exposure). This comparison may be ‘adjusted’ by including other variables in the model, but, without 
variation in treatment status, the model could not be estimated. 
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In a randomised trial, individuals are randomly assigned to treatment and comparison groups, and 
so, if the sample is large and there is full compliance with the experimental design, the treatment 
and comparison group will be, on average, the same in all dimensions, including in untreated 
outcomes. The outcomes of the untreated comparison group are, therefore, a sound basis for 
estimating the unobserved untreated outcomes of the treatment group. 
In settings such as the LPPC, where there has not been randomisation, the problem is that the 
comparison group may differ from the treatment group in important ways. As a result, the outcomes 
of the comparison group may be a poor guide to what the outcomes of the treatment group would 
have been in the relevant period, had they not been treated. For example, in the simple-difference 
design, if there are important trends in outcomes (due to changing macro-economic conditions, 
for example), the past outcomes of the treatment group may not be a good guide to what their 
outcomes would have been, in the absence of treatment, in the period of interest. In the particular 
case of the LPPC, the lone parents exposed to the treatment were different in the past in the critical 
respect that their children were younger. It is well recognised that the age-of-youngest child is an 
important determinant of labour supply among lone parents, and this means that past outcomes 
of the treated group do not offer a compelling counterfactual. Thus, the simple-difference or time-
series research design is unattractive. 
To choose among alternative evaluation strategies is to choose a comparison group that offers 
a compelling and convincing contrast, and possibly, also to choose a method of adjusting the 
outcomes of that comparison group to make the contrast more convincing. As the LPPC is being 
rolled out nationally, the choice of comparison groups is limited. The view of the research team 
is that any research design that involves comparisons with comparison groups comprised of 
individuals other than lone parents (for example, single women, or members of couples) is not 
credible: the labour supply behavior of these groups is just too different for such a research design 
to be compelling.4 Thus, attention was focused on research designs involving contrasts with lone 
parents who are not exposed to the LPPC. There are two groups:
• lone parents with a youngest child of a different age (including perhaps data on the same 
individuals at an earlier date);
• lone parents who are exempted from the change.
As noted above, a review of the particulars of the LPPC, and of the programme evaluation literature 
has led us to conclude that: 
• the most compelling contrast available is between affected lone parents and lone parents that 
are not affected because of the age of their youngest child;
• it is necessary to use data from other (pre-LPPC) time periods to correct for those differences in 
the behavior of lone parents with children of different ages that are not related to the LPPC. 
These elements suggest a DiD research design.
4 Some papers have used mothers in couples as comparison groups for lone mothers with a 
DiD approach (Gregg and Harkness, 2003). That may be appropriate when the population 
of interest is all mothers (as it was in Gregg and Harkness). However, in this application, the 
population of interest is parents receiving an out-of-work benefit, and there are considerable 
differences between lone mothers receiving an out-of-work benefit, and mothers in couples 
with children receiving an out-of-work benefit.
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Such contrasts can be implemented through a standard DiD estimator (which can be implemented 
via linear regression, as will be explained below). It is also possible to set up the conditioning 
variables in a duration model (particularly variables capturing time and group effects) in such a way 
as to implement the contrasts described above. A duration model will typically involve additional 
assumptions relative to a standard DiD estimator, but enables more outcomes to be examined, for 
example the effect of the LPPC on the subsequent job duration, subsequent claims of out-of-work 
benefits, and, if the data permits, on earnings. 
The next two sections briefly review some research designs which were deemed by the research 
team to be inappropriate for this particular impact evaluation, and the reasons for those conclusions 
(Section 3.2) and then discuss the difference-in-difference design, the possible threats to the validity 
of that design, and the reasons why it should work well in this context (Section 3.3). 
Before turning to a review of possible research designs, Box 3.1 offers a formal statement of the 
evaluation problem: this is based on the Potential	Outcomes framework which is often ascribed to 
Rubin (1974) (see, for example, Holland, 1986) but which dates back to the much earlier work of 
statisticians such as Fisher and Neyman. 
Box 3.1 – A formal statement of the evaluation problem
The evaluation problem can be formalised as follows. Let Y
1
 and Y
0
 be random variables 
capturing the outcome for an individual if they do, and do not, receive treatment (in this case, 
the LPPC) respectively. The realisations of these random variables for individual i are given by Y
1i
 
and Y
0i
. The impact of treatment for this individual is given by:
	 Δi  = Y1i - Y0i          (1)	
This framework makes a stable-unit-treatment-value assumption: the impact of an intervention 
may vary across individuals but is assumed to be constant for a particular individual (no 
general equilibrium effects, for example). In other respects it is quite general. First, Y
1i
 and Y
0i
 
are allowed to capture unintended effects. Second, this framework allows for heterogeneity 
in the impact of the treatment. Third, while a single treatment has been assumed to keep 
the exposition simple, the argument applies where there are multiple treatments as well; a 
treatment can be thought of as ‘a policy regime’).
The essence of the evaluation problem is as follows. For those who receive treatment, only 
the treated outcome (Y
1i
) is observed, and for those who are not treated only the untreated 
outcome (Y
0i
) is observed. For each individual, the only observed outcome is: 
 Y
1
 = D
i
Y
1i
 + (1 – D
i
) Y
0i
         (2)
Where D
i 
 is a dummy (0,1 indicator) variable indicating the incidence of treatment. 
For no individual is more than one of Y
1i
 and Y
0i
 observed, and thus their difference is never 
known. 
Suppose a researcher wants to estimate the average effect of the Lone Parent Obligations (LPO) 
on those who are exposed to the treatment (D
i
=1). This is given by:
 E [Δ
i
 | D
i
 = 1] = E [Y
1i
 – Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 1] = E [Y
1i
 | D
i
 = 1] –  E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 1]   (3)
where E [] denotes the expectation (or average), and E [ | D
i
 = 1] denotes a conditional 
expectation (the average if D
i
=1). E [Y
1i
 | D
i
 = 1] is easily estimated using data on outcomes of 
treated individuals. The problem is: how can E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 1] be estimated when Y
0i
 is not observed 
for those individuals for whom D
i
 = 1? 
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One possibility is to use the outcomes of non-treated individuals as a measure of what 
treated individuals would have experienced had they not received treatment. These are then a 
comparison group and the comparison gives:
 E [Y
1i
 | D
i
 = 1] – E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 0] = E [Y
1i
 – Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 1] + E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 1] – E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 0] = 
 E [Δ
i
 | D
i
 = 1] + (E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 1] – E [Y
0i
 | D
i
 = 0])      (4)
Comparing the observed outcomes of those who are and are not exposed to the LPPC will yield 
a biased estimate of the average effect of treatment on the treated if the treated would have 
had different outcomes than non-treated in the absence of treatment. The second term on 
the right-hand-side of the equation above captures this bias, often called ‘selection bias’. For 
example, if the comparison group is composed of lone parents with children too young to be 
affected by the LPPC, then they will almost certainly have different exit rates from benefit and 
employment rates in the absence of the LPPC. The key issue in thinking about different possible 
estimators is how Y
0i
 varies across individuals.
3.2 Some alternative evaluation strategies
This section briefly reviews some research designs that the research team concluded were not 
appropriate for this particular impact evaluation, and the reasons for those conclusions.
3.2.1 Simple-difference, regression, and matching
The first possibility is a simple comparison of lone parents directly affected by the LPPC with 
comparison groups drawn from lone parents who are ineligible or exempt. As noted in Section 2.1, 
the former would be lone parents with a younger child, and the latter would include lone parents 
who were receiving a disability benefit or Carer’s Allowance, or who are fostering. It seems obvious 
that such comparisons would not be credible: the variables that distinguish these groups (age of 
youngest child, disability) certainly affect the outcomes of interest (employment, transitions off 
benefit, etc.) and so the outcomes of such lone parents would be a poor guide to the counterfactual 
untreated outcomes of the treated group. 
A variant of this would be to use data on the treated lone parents in the past (ie when their children 
were younger) to estimate their counterfactual outcomes. This is the time-series or longitudinal 
version of the simple-difference design. However, as noted above, lone parents exposed to the 
treatment were different in the past in the critical respect that their children were younger, and age 
of youngest child is an important determinant of labour supply among lone parents. This would, 
therefore, not be a compelling comparison. 
Finally, one might think of choosing an earlier cohort of lone parents with children of the same age 
as those going through the LPPC. However, such a comparison would capture both the impact of the 
LPPC and any change in outcomes due to changing economic circumstances over time (and such 
changes might be thought to be significant, given that the LPPC took place during a recession).
With rich data it is sometimes possible to ‘adjust’ the outcomes of a comparison group for 
differences between the treatments and comparison group. This can improve the estimate of the 
counterfactual drawn from the comparison group, and so lead to a more accurate estimate of the 
impact of a policy. This can be done with a variety of methods including regression, matching or 
reweighting. For example, a regression-based approach would assume that untreated outcomes 
depend upon a set of explanatory variables, or covariates, X
i
):
  Y
0i
 = αX
i
 + u
i
          (5)
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These methods work well when two conditions are met:
• there must be common support in the variables that will form the basis for adjustment (the 
covariates, X
i
). For example, to adjust for differences in age between the treatment and 
comparison groups, there must be individuals in the comparison group of the same age as each of 
the members of the treatment group. If all of the comparison group members are under 40, and 
all the treatment group members are over 40, then no credible adjustment for age differences is 
possible;
• regression and matching methods rest on conditional mean independence. This means that, 
having conditioned on the available covariates, the adjusted untreated outcomes of the 
treatment and comparison group must be (on average) the same. (In the notation above, this 
means that E [u
i
 | D
i
 = 1] = E [u
i
 | D
i
 = 0].) Note that this can only be an assumption: the untreated 
outcomes of the treatment group are not observed. Nevertheless, it is possible to reflect on the 
plausibility of the assumption. 
It is difficult to believe that either of these conditions are met by the LPPC:
• individuals in the potential comparison groups belong to those groups precisely because they 
have characteristics that are not shared by members of the treatment group. For example, if 
the comparison group of lone parents with younger children is used, there are no members of 
that group who have a youngest child the same age as the youngest child of members of the 
treatment group. This would mean that common support does not exist, and so it is not possible 
to adjust credibly for age of youngest child (as a regression covariate or matching variable);
• on the other hand, if this variable is not adjusted for, conditional independence is unlikely: 
because age of youngest child is an important determinant of labour supply, the untreated 
employment outcomes of the two groups are very likely to be quite different. 
Put more simply, the potential comparison groups differ from the treatment group in dimensions 
that are very likely to affect the outcomes of interest; moreover, they are distinctly different from 
the treatment group in these dimensions, which precludes adjusting for these differences through 
regression or matching techniques. 
3.2.2 Regression discontinuity
There are many circumstances in which treated and untreated individuals take on discretely 
different values of a key variable. In such cases, there is a ‘cut-off’ value, which separates the 
groups. In a hypothetical example, students with grades above a certain cut-off will receive the 
treatment of a scholarship, while students with lower grades are not treated; similarly, candidates or 
parties receiving more than 50 per cent of the vote (in a two-party system) will win an election, and 
candidates with less than 50 per cent of the vote will not. 
Such circumstances often lend themselves to a regression discontinuity design. This is an old idea 
(Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960) which has recently received renewed and intense interest 
from economists. The basic idea is that individuals just below the cut-off may be very similar to 
individuals just above the cut-off, and so a reasonable estimate of the programme effect can be 
obtained by comparing the outcomes of individuals just below and above the cut-off. 
This idea can be implemented in a number of ways (for a very good guide to practice see Imbens 
and Lemieux, 2007). Strengths of this method include the fact that, under certain conditions, the 
comparison of individuals just below and above the cut-off is as good as randomisation (in a way 
that can be made precise). Thus, under certain conditions there is a strong case for the internal 
validity of the method. Moreover, there are a range of fairly intuitive and easy-to-implement 
specification tests that can be applied (again see Imbens and Lemieux). 
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A weakness of the method is that it really only delivers an estimate of the policy effect at the 
cut-off. If, for example, the effect of a scholarship on the outcomes of students far above the 
scholarship cut-off is very different from the effect on students near the cut-off, then little can be 
learnt about the former group using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. In this sense, the RD 
design does not do well on external validity. 
A RD design was used by de Georgi (2005) to evaluate the impact on New Deal for Young People 
(NDYP), by comparing unemployed young adults who were 24 (and therefore, affected) and 25 
(not affected). Similarly, Mulheirn and Pisani (2008) examine the effect of the Working Tax Credit 
for childless adults without children over the age of 25 by comparing changes in labour market 
participation just above and just below the cut-off. Lemieux and Milligan (2007) look at the effect 
of higher unemployment benefits for those over 30 on labour market participation by comparing 
the employment rates of those aged just above and below 30. At first consideration it might seem 
that evaluation of the LPPC is an ideal setting for a RD design because there is a sharp cut-off in the 
age of youngest child in determining entitlement to IS as a lone parent. However, further reflection 
suggests that this is not the case. The key requirement for an RD design is that the probability of 
treatment is discontinuous in the forcing variable (here, age of youngest child). But this does not 
occur with the LPPC – although there is a sharp change in the benefit regime faced by lone parents 
when they lose entitlement to IS, because of anticipation effects, there is no discontinuity in the 
effect of the treatment at this point. This is because lone parents know that they are about to face 
this change and may not be able to time their response to it perfectly. For example, if a lone parent 
has decided to start work when they lose IS entitlement, it is unlikely they will be able to find a job 
immediately at this point and so they might actually start work shortly before or afterwards. This 
contrasts, for example, with the scholarship case: a student that just misses the scholarship cut-
off does not anticipate receiving the scholarship a month later. Similarly, those who want to leave 
work when their benefits increase when they reach the appropriate age can simply quit their jobs 
at this point. However, if lone parents with a youngest child just below the cut-off age change their 
behaviour as a result of knowing that they will soon be treated, then the regression discontinuity 
design is invalidated. These effects are highly likely, and so the regression discontinuity design does 
not seem appropriate for an evaluation of the LPPC.
3.2.3 ‘The Norway Approach’
Pronzato and Morgstad (2008) estimate the effect of a Norwegian welfare reform by looking at the 
outcomes of mothers in couples who become lone parents before and after a reform is introduced. 
In order to control for wider economic trends, they use a DiD estimate in each period, comparing 
what happens to those who become lone parents with those who do not. This does not rely on 
the ‘common trends’ assumption so much as a pure DiD approach, but it does require that any 
differential trend in the outcomes of mothers who remain in couples and those who become 
lone parents is constant over time. However, there are two reasons why this approach is not 
recommended:
• this study uses register data on the whole Norwegian population. No such dataset exists in the UK, 
and there is no way of identifying women who become lone parents in the administrative data 
that is available;
• this approach estimates the effect of the programme on those women who become lone parents. 
These estimates are, therefore, unlikely to have external validity to the population of lone parents 
as a whole. Also, this approach cannot be used to estimate the effect of the LPPC on lone parents 
already claiming IS, who are one of the main groups affected by it.
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3.3 The difference-in-difference design 
Suppose data exists on individuals before the introduction of the treatment. In what follows, 
outcomes (such as employment) in the period after treatment are denoted as Y
1i,t
 and Y
0i,t
 , and 
outcomes in the period before treatment as Y
1i,t-1
 or Y
0i,t-1
. 
If the treatment does not have any effect before it occurs (as might be the case if the treatment is 
not anticipated), then Y
1i,t-1
 and Y
0i,t-1
 are equal. However, because of the same kinds of ‘selection bias’ 
reasons given above, it would not be wise to assume that the average pre-treatment outcomes of 
the treatment and comparison groups are the same. Thus:
 E [Y
0i,t-1
 | D
i
 = 1] ≠ E [Y
0i,t-1
 | D
i
 = 0]        (6)
The DiD design compares changes (that occur when the treatment is introduced) in outcomes for 
treated and untreated individuals. Formally, the DiD estimate is given by: 
   (7)
where the third line uses the fact that Y
1i,t-1
 and Y
0i,t-1
 are equal, and the final line used the definition 
Y
1i
 - Y
0i
 = Δ
i
 = Δ (for simplicity, assume that the treatment effect is equal for all treated individuals).
This is a good estimator of the true impact if: 
      (8)
This says that, in the absence of treatment, changes over time in the outcomes would be similar 
for the two groups (treated and untreated); this is normally referred to as the common trends 
assumption. 
Equation (8), which says that the average change in untreated outcomes is the same in the two 
groups, contrasts with Equation (6), which says that the average level in untreated outcomes is 
not the same. If the common trends assumption is true, then the comparison group provides good 
information about the counterfactual because changes in the outcomes of the comparison group 
tell us how the outcomes of the treatment groups would have evolved in the absence of treatment. 
The common trends assumption will hold in practice if: 
 E [Y
0it
 | t, D] = α
t
 + γ
D
         (9)
In other words, it will hold if untreated outcomes depend on a ‘time effect’, and a ‘group effect’, but 
where the time effect is common to the groups (treatment and comparison) and the group effect 
(the difference between the treatment group and the comparison group) is constant through time. 
Crucially, there is no interaction effect, and this is what allows us to attribute any difference in the 
changes over time in the two groups to the treatment. 
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This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups have different 
levels, but would have the same trend if there were no treatment. The comparison group can, 
therefore, be used to infer what would have happened to the treatment group in the absence of 
treatment (the counterfactual). Subtracting the change experienced by the comparison group 
from the change experienced by the treatment group gives a good estimate of the effect of the 
treatment.
Figure 3.1 Comparison of the treatment and comparison groups after treatment  
 is introduced
Noting that observed outcomes are Y
it
 = Y
0it
 + ΔD
it
 , the ‘common trends’ assumption about the 
variation Y
0it
 implies that: 
 Y
it
 = α
t
 + γ
D
 + ΔD
it
 + u
it
         (10)
Where u
it
 = Y
0it
 – E [Y
0it 
 | t, D] (and thus E [u
it
 | D
it
 = 1] = E [u
it 
 | D
it
 = 0]).
In the simplest implementation of the DiD design, there are just two groups (treatment and 
comparison) and two time periods (before and after). The time and group effects can be captured 
then, by a single dummy for the treatment group, and a single dummy for the ‘after’ period. Thus:
 E [Y
0i
 | t, D] = α
t
 + γ
D
 = α + βA
it
 + γT
it
       (11)
and:
 Y
1i
 = α
0
 + α
1
A
it  
+ γT
it 
 + ΔD
it
 + u
it
        (12)
where A
it
 is a dummy equal to one in the ‘after’ period and zero otherwise; T
it
 is a dummy equal to 
one of the individual belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise; D
it
 is the dummy indicating 
receipt of treatment, and u
it
 is as above. The parameters of this regression can be related to the 
mean outcomes of different groups in different periods, as Table 3.1 illustrates.
Time
Outcome
Treatment group
Policy introduced
Counterfactual
Control group
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Table 3.1 A simple difference-in-difference design
Mean (average) 
outcomes Treatment group Comparison group
Difference between 
groups
After α
0
 + α
1
 + γ + Δ α
0
 + α
1
γ + Δ
Before α
0
 + γ α
0
γ
Difference over time α
1
 + Δ α
1
Δ
Table 3.1 also illustrates an alternative formulation of the common trends assumption. Assuming 
that the time effects are common to groups is the same as assuming the group effects are constant 
through time. Thus, the DiD estimator can be thought of in two equivalent ways. Either:
• compare the change in the treatment group with the introduction of policy (α
1
 + Δ), and use the 
comparison group to estimate the counterfactual time trend (α
1
); or
• compare the treatment group and comparison group after the policy change γ + Δ, and then use 
the pre-treatment period to estimate the difference between the groups which is unrelated to 
treatment (γ).
The latter intuition is a natural way to think about this approach to the LPPC evaluation. During 
the policy roll-out, outcomes of groups of lone parents affected by the policy can be compared 
with groups that are not affected. However, these groups differ in the age of the youngest child. 
Section 3.2 discussed alternative research designs and noted that if comparison groups are 
chosen that were very close to the treatment group in terms of age of youngest child (as in the 
regression discontinuity design), anticipation effects would confound the comparison, because the 
comparison group would anticipate treatment in the very near future. On the other hand, a simple 
comparison between affected lone parents and lone parents with much younger children would 
not be compelling because the labour supply behaviour of such a comparison group would be very 
different, and such differences were directly related to the age of youngest child, and so difficult to 
eliminate through controlling for other variables. 
The DiD design offers a way out of this dilemma: lone parents affected by the LPPC can be compared 
with lone parents with sufficiently younger children to diminish the likelihood of anticipation effects, 
and then data from periods before the LPPC roll-out can be used to estimate the difference in 
outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups that results simply from the differences 
in the ages of their youngest children and that is unrelated to the LPPC. As in Table 4.1, the direct 
comparison of treatment and comparison groups confounds the treatment effect and group effects; 
but the common trends assumption implies that the group effects are time-invariant, so the pre-
treatment period can be used to estimate the group effects; having done so, they can be removed 
from the treatment period differences to isolate the treatment effect.
3.3.1 Extending the DiD design: more than two groups or time periods
This sub-section considers extensions to the DiD design where there are more than two groups or 
more than two time periods (including situations, like LPPC, where the policy under investigation has 
different start dates for different groups).
The simple (two group, two period) DiD design generalises naturally to a setting – such as the 
evaluation of the LPPC – where there are multiple comparisons involving multiple groups (defined by 
the age of the youngest child), multiple time periods and multiple start dates for the policy. In such 
situations, standard DiD design continues to require the common trends assumption (ie that  
E [Y
0it
 | t, D] = α
t
 + γ
D
), but the regression Y
it
 = α
t
 + γ
D 
 + ΔD
it
 + u
it
 now contains a full set of time 
dummies, and a full set of group dummies (capturing α
t
 and γ
D
) respectively. 
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The model can also be extended to allow for different treatment effects at different times or for 
different groups; this will be important when allowing for anticipation effects (below). A model with 
multiple treatment effects can be implemented by estimating a regression of the form: 
        (13)
where Δk is now the effect of policy k and D
it
k is a dummy indicating that individual i is exposed to 
policy k at time t. This sort of model was used in Brewer et	al. (2009) to estimate the impact of the 
lone parent pilots, which had different start dates in each of the four sets of districts in which it was 
implemented.
If data is available for multiple time periods before the policy begins, then it is possible to estimate 
a trend-adjusted DiD model (see section IV.C.2 of Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008 or p444 of Blundell 
and Costa Dias, 2008; see also Bell et	al., 1999). A trend-adjusted DiD model allows the common 
trends assumption to be relaxed. If outcomes for the treatment and comparison group follow 
different trends, then the conventional DiD estimator will estimate the sum of the true impact of the 
policy plus a contribution from the diverging trends. But, given sufficient pre-programme data, and 
on the assumption that the difference in the trends would be constant in the absence of any policy 
change, the different trends can be estimated, and so the DiD estimator corrected (see section 
IV.C.2 of Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008 for full derivation). 
3.3.2 Threats to the internal validity of the DiD design
The key assumptions of the DiD design are:
• there are no anticipation effects; 
• the common trends assumption.
As shown above, the formal derivation of the DiD approach rests on the absence of a treatment 
effect in the pre-treatment period (so that Y
1i,t-1
 and Y
0i,t-1
 are equal). Less formally, the immediate 
problem that anticipation effects cause is that treatment group outcomes are altered by the 
treatment in both ‘pre’ and ‘post’ treatment periods, so that differencing the data eliminates 
some part of the treatment effect. (The anticipation of treatment can cause further, more subtle 
problems, which are discussed below in the context of the common trends assumption.)
Because the LPPC was announced sometime before it was implemented, and because eligibility 
is very predictable (depending, in very approximate terms, on the age of the youngest child and 
calendar time), one might expect behavioural responses to occur before individuals are actually 
exposed to the obligation. As Section 2.1 discussed, in the case of the LPPC, it makes sense to define 
the treatment as beginning 12 months before the date on which the lone parent loses entitlement 
to IS as a lone parent, as this is when the quarterly WFIs and other services begin. It would also be 
sensible to allow the policy effect to vary according to whether loss of entitlement is anticipated 
or has actually occurred, and this can be done with a specification including multiple treatment 
dummies and multiple treatment effects (as described above). 
Therefore, the key concern is with the common trends assumption. Failure of the common trends 
assumption is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Results of failure of the common trend accumption
A reading of the literature suggests six key reasons why the common trends assumption fails to 
hold. These are discussed below, along with an assessment of whether any is likely to be relevant to 
the LPPC evaluation.
1 Treatments and comparison group are drawn from different local labour markets. In this case, 
the comparison might experience (for example) different increases in employment opportunities 
(if the economy of the local area from which the comparison group are drawn is growing more 
strongly than the local area from which the treatments are drawn). A well known illustration of 
this problem is Angrist and Krueger’s reanalysis of Card’s analysis of the Mariel Boatlift (Angrist 
and Krueger, 1999; Card, 1990). As treatments and comparison groups can be drawn from the 
same local labour markets, this should not be a problem for the LPPC evaluation. 
2 The common trends assumption will fail if programme eligibility depends on lagged outcomes, 
and those lagged outcomes are mean-reverting. For example, if incomes vary from year to year, 
and programme eligibility depended on income being below a threshold, then the treatment 
group will be composed of individuals with temporarily low incomes (that would be expected 
to rise even in the absence of treatment) and the comparison group will be disproportionately 
drawn from individuals with temporarily high incomes (which can be expected to fall). This is a 
version of ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’ (Ashenfelter, 1978). It will lead to a spurious estimate of a positive 
treatment effect (and is shown visually in Figure 3.3). Another well-known example of this is 
when schools are eligible for a programme on the basis of low test scores (Chay et	al., 2005). 
Again, this is not relevant for the LPO evaluation because eligibility for treatment does not 
depend on lagged outcomes. By definition, eligibility for the LPPC depends upon being on IS, but 
this will also be true for the suggested comparison group: the difference between treatment and 
comparison groups will be based on the date of birth of the youngest child.
Time
Outcome 
Treatment group  
Control group  
Counterfactual  
Failure of the 
common 
trends 
assumption  
Event or policy change  
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Figure 3.3 Failure of the common trend assumption if programme eligibility  
 depends on mean-reverting lagged outcomes
 
Time
Outcome 
Outcome/ 
participation 
criteria 
Policy introduced
Treatment 
group
 
Control 
group
3 The outcome is bounded, and the comparison group is near the bound (see Figure 3.4). Eissa 
and Liebman (1996) used childless single women as a comparison group for female lone 
parents when examining the impact of the US earned income tax credit on employment rates. 
One potential problem is that, in the US, the employment rates of single women exceeded 
90 per cent. This means that there is little scope for childless single women to increase their 
employment rates, but lone parents, with lower employment rates, do have greater scope to 
respond to macroeconomic developments; essentially, a situation with outcomes near a bound 
makes the common trends assumption much less plausible (see Figure 3.4). As noted above, the 
suggested comparison group to evaluate the LPPC comprises lone parents who have children of 
different ages. These groups have baseline employment or benefit receipt rates that, while a little 
different from the treatment group, are far below 100 per cent (and nowhere near as dissimilar 
as single women with and without children). Thus, this problem seems irrelevant for the LPPC 
evaluation.
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Figure 3.4 Result if the outcome is limited and the comparison group is near it
4 Differential effect of coincident policy changes. If there are other policy changes occurring 
around the time of the treatment in question, and if those changes have a differential impact 
on treatment and comparison groups, then the change over time observed for the comparison 
group will be a poor guide to what the counterfactual time path of outcomes would have been 
for the treatment group, in the absence of the treatment in question. This is a potential problem 
in the evaluation of the LPPC because of the large number of concurrent policy innovations. 
Nevertheless, this problem can be handled empirically, and this is discussed further in  
Section 6.2.
5 Group composition changes, including those associated with the anticipation of treatment. 
The DiD design assumes that the composition of the group is constant. If the composition of the 
treatment or comparison group changes over time, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the 
treatment from the effects of changing composition. One way that this can happen is if group 
membership is defined by variables that are not completely time invariant, and, in particular, if 
group membership might be affected by the anticipation of treatment. If compositional changes 
are driven by the anticipation of treatment, then they will affect treatment and comparison 
groups differently, so that the trends in the two groups will be different (see also Section 6.1). 
Time
Outcome
 
Treatment group  
Policy introduced  
Control group
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 The nature of the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) data, combined with the fact 
that the LPPC is likely to be anticipated, mean this is a potential problem for the evaluation 
of LPPC that makes use of WPLS data. The WPLS contain only claimants, and so the groups 
will be defined as those lone parents receiving IS. If earlier anticipation of treatment (that is, 
anticipation more than 12 months before) induces a non-random subset of lone parents to leave 
IS before treatment, then the composition of the treatment group will change over time. This 
would invalidate the ‘common trends’ assumption (for further discussion of this type of problem, 
see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008). This problem can be overcome empirically by assuming the 
LPPC starts to affect lone parents more than 12 months before they lose IS entitlement and 
selecting a sample of lone parents on IS, say, 24 months before they lost IS entitlement. This 
would ensure that selection into the sample was unaffected by the LPPC. 
6 Spillover effects affecting the comparison group. The DiD design requires that the comparison 
group are completely unaffected by the existence of the policy. If the LPPC increases labour 
supply among the treatment group and this affects wages and the availability of jobs more 
generally, this assumption will be violated and the DiD estimator will be incorrect; it will 
incorrectly classify these negative spillover effects affecting the comparison group as positive 
treatment effects affecting the treatment group. This is likely to be a problem with an eventual 
IA as the treatment and comparison groups are drawn from the same labour market and are 
likely to be substitutable for each other from the point of view of employers. However, the size of 
any such spillover effects should be small, given that the treatment group is small relative to the 
overall size of the labour market, and given the likely size of the policy effects. 
3.4 Choosing a comparison group
Section 3.3 argued that the most suitable comparison group is lone parents whose children are too 
young to be directly affected by the LPPC. Appendix B lists exactly which comparison groups (defined 
by the dates of birth of the youngest child) would be in each phase of the roll-out. There are several 
important points to note:
• there is a trade-off between examining outcomes for a longer period of time or allowing for longer 
anticipation effects, and reducing the difference between the treatment and comparison groups 
in terms of the age of the youngest child. The calculations in Appendix B assumed a maximum 
period of interest of four years, which would include two years of anticipation effects and two 
years of after effects, or one year of anticipation effects and three years of after effects. 
• there is also a trade-off between the size of the comparison groups for the stock phases, and the 
difference in age of youngest child between the treatment and comparison groups. 
• there are larger differences in the age of the youngest child between the treatment and 
comparison groups at the start of the roll-out than towards the end, or when evaluating the 
steady-state policy. 
• lone parents whose youngest child was born between October 2004 and October 2006 are the 
comparison group for a large number of phases of lone parents affected by the LPPC. If a shock 
affects this group but not the groups affected by the treatment at this time, then the evaluation 
of a large number of the phases of the roll-out will be invalidated. 
It is also important to consider which period should form the ‘before’ period for any DiD approach. 
There is a concern in this case because Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) were rolled out gradually 
by age of the youngest child between April 2001 and April 2004, meaning that the treatment and 
comparison groups were also being treated differently over time. There are two possible solutions to 
this problem:
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• only the period after April 2004 (and/or the very short period before April 2001) could be used as 
the ‘before’ period. This would ensure that there was no difference in the WFI regimes faced by 
the treatment and comparison groups, but it might be the case that there was not enough time 
between then and the introduction of the LPPC to provide robust evidence on the relationship 
between labour market outcomes and age of youngest child in the absence of the LPPCs;
• alternatively, the different WFI regimes could be explicitly modelled in the DiD model. This would 
involve adding dummy variables to the model indicating which WFI regime a lone parent was 
subject to at a particular time. Using this methodology would involve implicitly assuming that the 
effect of a particular WFI regime was uniform, both over time and age of youngest child. But it 
would allow more data to be used to estimate the relationship between labour market outcomes 
and age of youngest child in the absence of the LPPCs.
3.5 Assessing whether common trends holds between lone  
 parents affected by the LPPC and lone parents with younger  
 children
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 argued that, in principle, DiD method, using lone parents with younger children 
as a comparison group, would be an appropriate method to use in an eventual IA. 
This section assesses empirically the suitability of DiD with lone parents with younger children as 
a comparison group. It does this by testing whether the common trends assumption holds in the 
period before the LPPC was introduced, by applying the DiD methods to data from the period before 
the LPPC was introduced (this is sometimes known as a placebo test, or pre-programme test). 
The argument for performing these pre-programme tests is as follows: if data has been chosen 
from a period where the policy regime did not change differentially for lone parents with younger 
and older children, then it should be the case that the DiD method finds no significant evidence 
of a policy effect. If, however, the DiD method does find significant evidence of a policy effect 
where none should exist, then this suggests that the method or the chosen comparison group are 
inappropriate.5
To implement these pre-programme tests, it was necessary to replicate as closely as possible the 
groups who would be affected by the LPPC (as defined by the age of their children), and compare 
these with the same comparison groups that would be used by an eventual IA, but choosing lone 
parents observed before LPPC began. This was done as follows:
5 It should be borne in mind however, that some potential problems cannot be detected 
by this procedure. In particular, pre-programme data cannot be used to assess threats to 
the ‘common trends’ assumption that are relevant only to the treatment period, such as 
points 4 and 5 in Section 3.3.2. Therefore, the common trends assumption may fail during 
the treatment period even if it was shown to have held during the pre-treatment period. 
A particular concern for this IA is that the LPPC is being implemented during a recession, 
and there is no pre-programme data to test whether common trends held during previous 
recessions.
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• using the WPLS, all lone parents who are on IS on five particular dates (1 April of 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2005) were selected;
• for each of these five samples, it was determined which lone parents would be affected by each 
phase of the LPPC if it had been introduced one year after each of these dates (e.g. 1 April 2002 
for those initially observed on benefit on 1 April 2001)6. This calculation was based on the date of 
birth of the child who was the youngest on the date on which they are selected;7
• for each of the five samples, an appropriate comparison group was selected from among the lone 
parents with younger children on IS on the same date. (See Section 3.4 and Appendix B for details 
of appropriate comparison groups for each of the phases of the roll-out of the LPPC);
• the outcomes of the lone parents in each group (according to the measure of benefit receipt and 
employment in the WPLS) are then tracked over the next three years (two years in the case of 
those selected on 1 April 2005).
This section first presents analysis based on simple average outcomes, and then presents analysis 
based on regression models to implement the DiD models. 
3.5.1 Assessing the suitability of DiD with lone parents with younger children  
 as a comparison group: analysis using simple averages
This section compares, graphically, how quickly lone parents observed at different points in 
time with differently aged youngest children leave benefit and start work. This provides a visual 
assessment of the common trends assumption.
Figure 3.5 compares lone parents whose youngest child is aged between 11 and 14 on the date they 
are sampled (so they are aged between 12 and 15 on the day the hypothetical LPPC comes into 
effect one year later; this is the group that were affected by the phase 1 of the roll-out of the LPPC) 
with those whose youngest child is aged two to three on the day they are first sampled (so they 
are aged three to four on the day the hypothetical LPPC comes into effect one year later; this is the 
group that is recommended to be used by an eventual IA as the comparison group). Clearly, all are 
on benefit at the time they are first sampled and then some leave (and some then start new benefit 
claims).8
Benefit outcomes in the period from April 2001 to April 2007 were similar for the two groups, 
although they differ by around one percentage point at most points in time. If anything, the 
outcomes for the treatment group (those whose youngest child is aged between 12 and 15) 
deteriorate slightly relative to those of the comparison group (those whose youngest child is aged 
three or four). 
6 We refer to this hypothetical policy change as a ‘hypothetical LPPC’.
7 This means that we include lone parents who would be affected if the hypothetical LPPC 
were introduced a year after they are initially observed based on the age of their youngest 
child at the point they are initially observed (i.e. those whose youngest child was aged six or 
over when we select our sample). This means that we effectively ignore the arrival of any 
additional children in the 12 months before the hypothetical LPPC starts. This is because the 
WPLS only records the arrival of additional children for those who remain on benefit. Using age 
of youngest child as measured in the WPLS on the date the LPPC starts to select the sample 
would, therefore, lead to bias. Also, having more children to delay being affected by the LPPC 
may be a behavioural response that we wish to measure.
8 The benefits we include here are the three main out-of-work benefits for lone parents during 
this period (IS, Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and Incapacity Benefit (IB)).
29The empirical approach
Figure 3.6 shows the same analysis comparing lone parents whose youngest child is aged ten 
to 11 with those whose youngest child is aged three to four (note that all figures use the same 
comparison group). This is broadly the group that has been affected by the second stage of the LPO 
roll-out. Once again, benefit outcomes are broadly similar for lone parents with differently aged 
youngest children, although are lower by up to 3.5 percentage points for those with children aged 
ten and 11 by the end of the period. However, those with older children tend to be slightly less likely 
to leave benefit at all times, and outcomes for those with older children tend to deteriorate slightly 
over time relative to those with younger children. 
Figure 3.7 performs the same analysis for lone parents whose youngest child is aged seven to 
nine, comparing them once again with lone parents whose youngest child is aged three or four.
This is, broadly speaking, the group which will be affected by the third phase of the roll-out of LPO. 
Outcomes for lone parents whose youngest child is aged seven to nine are particularly close to those 
of lone parents whose youngest child is aged three or four (as one might expect since they are close 
in age). However, lone parents whose youngest child is aged seven to nine are slightly slower to 
leave benefit than those whose youngest child is aged three or four (their outcomes are about one 
percentage point lower for most of the period), and that their outcomes deteriorate slightly over 
time relative to those of lone parents whose youngest child is aged three or four, becoming up to 3.5 
percentage points lower by the end of the period in question. 
Figures 3.8 to 3.10 show the differences in outcomes between lone parents with differently aged 
youngest children over time. The difference in outcomes between the two groups moves in a similar 
way over the three years for each cohort, as required by the common trends assumption, although 
outcomes for those with older children deteriorates relative to those with younger children in  
later years. 
Figure 3.5 Comparing trends of benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
 differently aged youngest children (12 to 15 compared to three  
 to four)
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Figure 3.6 Comparing trends of benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
 differently aged youngest children (10 to 11 compared to three  
 to four)
 
Figure 3.7 Comparing trends of benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
 differently aged youngest children (seven to nine compared to  
 three to four)
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Figure 3.8 Comparing differences in benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
 differently aged youngest children (12 to 15 compared to three  
 to four)
 
Figure 3.9 Comparing differences in benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
 differently aged youngest children (10 to 11 compared to three  
 to four)
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. Each line represents a 
different cohort of lone parents. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. Each line represents a 
different cohort of lone parents. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Figure 3.10  Comparing differences in benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (seven to nine compared to  
  three to four)
Figures 3.11 to 3.13 take the same samples of lone parents who are on IS on 1 April 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2005 and show how many of them are in work at different points in time over 
the next three years. The outcome measure is the work measure in the WPLS, which is based on 
estimated dates when jobs started and ended using information provided by employers to Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) for income tax purposes. There are two key problems with  
this data:9
• it does not necessarily contain information on all jobs, particularly those where the individual 
earns less than the income tax threshold;
• and there are many instances where the end date of an employment spell is not known. 
The result of this is that there are an implausibly large number of lone parents who appear to be on 
benefit and in work at the same time. Nevertheless, if this error is assumed to remain of a similar 
magnitude over time (and there is no way of testing whether this assumption is valid), a DiD analysis 
can still provide a valid estimate of the effect of the LPPC on the number of lone parents in work. 
9 Many analysts using the work records in the WPLS have made these comments: previous 
experience of IFS researchers can be found in Brewer, M., Browne, J., Chowdry, H. and 
Crawford, C. (2010), The	lone	parent	pilots	after	24-36	months:	the	final	impact	assessment	
of	In-Work	Credit,	Work	Search	Premium,	Extended	Schools	Childcare,	Quarterly	Work	Focused	
Interviews	and		New	Deal	Plus	for	Lone	Parents, DWP Research Report No. 606.
April
2001
April
2002
April
2003
April
2004
April
2005
April
2006
April
2007
Di
ff
er
en
ce
: o
ld
er
-y
ou
ng
er
 
ch
ild
re
n 
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. Each line represents a 
different cohort of lone parents. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Figure 3.11 compares lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 to 15 a year after they are 
initially sampled with those whose youngest child is aged three or four at the same point in time. 
Outcomes for lone parents with older children worsened slightly relative to those with younger 
children. This represents a slight deviation from the common trends assumption.10
Figure 3.12 shows the same analysis comparing lone parents whose youngest child is aged ten or 11 
with those whose youngest child is aged three or four. Work outcomes move roughly in parallel for 
the two groups, although there is some evidence that outcomes of lone parents with older children 
worsen relative to those of lone parents with younger children. This represents a slight deviation 
from the common trends assumption. 
Figure 3.13 shows the same analysis comparing lone parents whose youngest child is aged seven 
to nine with those whose youngest child is aged three or four. The difference in outcomes between 
lone parents with differently aged children remains broadly the same over time, although there is 
some evidence of outcomes for lone parents with younger children improving relative to those of 
lone parents with older children. 
Figures 3.14 to 3.16 highlight the differences in outcomes between lone parents with older and 
younger children. Ignoring the break in the series caused by a change in the methodology used by 
the WPLS in July 2003, the difference in outcomes between the two groups over the three years 
moves in a similar way for each cohort, although with a small deterioration in the outcomes of lone 
parents with older children relative to those of lone parents with younger children. 
10 As mentioned above, there is an implausibly large number of lone parents who are ‘in work’ 
at the same time as they are initially sampled as being on IS. There is also a discontinuity in 
the data in July 2003 caused by changes in the way it was collected. This problem appears to 
be worse for lone parents with older children than those with younger children. However, this 
is not a violation of the common trends assumption (this only requires that outcomes for the 
two groups change in the same way over time, not that they are identical in the absence of 
the LPPC).
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Figure 3.11  Comparing trends of work outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (12 to 15 compared to  
  three to four)
 
Figure 3.12  Comparing trends of work outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (10 to 11 compared to  
  three to four)
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Figure 3.13  Comparing trends of work outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (seven to nine compared to  
  three to four)
 
 
Figure 3.14  Comparing differences in benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (12 to 15 compared to  
  three to four)
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. Each line represents a 
different cohort of lone parents.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Figure 3.15  Comparing differences in benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (10 to 11 compared to  
  three to four)
 
Figure 3.16  Comparing differences in benefit outcomes for lone parents with  
  differently aged youngest children (seven to nine compared to  
  three to four)
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. Each line represents a 
different cohort of lone parents. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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Note: Samples of lone parents taken on five separate dates (1 April 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 
and 2005) and then followed for three years or until 1 April 2007 if sooner. Each line represents a 
different cohort of lone parents.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the WPLS.
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This analysis of simple average outcomes shows that lone parents with differently aged youngest 
children tend to leave benefit at fairly similar rates, on average, and that lone parents with older 
children are more likely to be in work at all times. In both cases though, outcomes for lone parents 
with older children deteriorated slightly over time relative to those of lone parents with younger 
children. This represents a slight deviation from the common trends assumption.
However, it is not clear whether the common trends assumption fails or not from just examining 
these figures, for two reasons: First, it may be the case that these apparent differences are in fact 
the result of changes in observable factors among lone parents. Second, any differences may not 
be statistically significant. To test formally the common trends assumption and control for other 
factors, regression models need to be estimated. The next section discusses how to conduct these 
tests correctly.
3.5.2 Correct inference in DiD models 
To test whether the common trends assumption is plausible in a regression framework, models of 
the following form were estimated (on the sample described above):
 y
it
 = α
t
 + γ
G
 + Δ. D
it
 + X r
it 
β + u
it
        (14)
where y
it
 is the outcome of interest, α
t
 is a time effect, γ
G
 is a group effect (in other words, an age 
of youngest child effect), Δ is the effect of the hypothetical LPPC, D
it
 is a dummy indicating that 
individual i is a lone parent whose youngest child is old enough for them to be affected by the 
hypothetical LPPC and they are observed in a period after the hypothetical LPPC was introduced, and 
u
it
 is an error term. If the Δ parameter was significantly different from zero, this would imply that 
the common trends assumption had failed, since this would show that trends in outcomes between 
lone parents with differently-aged children were different during a period when there was no policy 
change that affected lone parents differently by age of youngest child. 
But an important issue when estimating and interpreting such regression models, though, is how to 
estimate correctly the standard errors of the impact of the hypothetical policy (in other words, how 
to test whether the Δ parameter is statistically significantly different from zero). Standard inference 
using ordinary least squares regression assumes that each observation (i.e. each lone parent) is 
randomly drawn from the same distribution, and is independent from all other observations. This 
clearly does not hold in this instance, where lone parents in the sample are from one of four distinct 
groups – those lone parents with older and younger children, who are observed before or after the 
hypothetical policy change has taken place. In reality, therefore, there is likely to be a component of 
the error term that is common to all lone parents whose youngest child is a particular age observed 
in a particular time period.11
In the case where all members of a particular group are affected by a common error, the model 
becomes: 
 y
it
 = α
t
 + γ
G
 + Δ. D
it
 + X r
it 
β + v
Gt
 + ε
it
       (15)
11 This problem was initially studied by Moulton (1986).
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where v
Gt
 is a shock that is common to all lone parents whose youngest child is a certain age in a 
particular time period, and ε
it
 is an idiosyncratic shock that is particular to each lone parent.12 Having 
a large sample of lone parents in each group (where group is defined by age of youngest child) and 
each time period will reduce the standard errors on the coefficients of interest caused by the latter 
error, but will do nothing to eliminate the shocks common to a particular group and time period. 
Assuming that the error term is idiosyncratic (i.e. not accounting for the fact that a part of the error 
term is likely to be common to all lone parents in a particular group and time period) will, therefore, 
underestimate the size of the standard errors of the parameters of the model, and lead to incorrect 
inferences being drawn. 
One way of accounting for the fact that the error term in the model is of the form specified in (15) 
is to ‘cluster’ the standard errors to account for the fact that error terms are likely to be correlated 
between lone parents in the same group and time period. The standard errors that are produced 
by this procedure will provide valid inference so long as the component of the error term that is 
common to all members of a group in a particular time period (represented by v
Gt 
in equation (15)) 
are uncorrelated between groups and time periods. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be the case. 
The error terms for a particular group are also likely to be serially correlated – that is to say that if 
lone parents whose youngest child is a particular age are affected by a common shock in period t, 
the common shock to all lone parents whose youngest child is the same age in period t+1 is likely to 
be similar.13 Therefore, just as the standard errors from the model need to be adjusted as a result of 
the correlation of error terms within groups at a particular time period, they also need adjusting to 
account for serial correlation in these error terms themselves. The simplest way of dealing with this 
problem is to ‘cluster’ standard errors at the group, rather than the group and time period level.14 
This allows for the error term to be correlated within all lone parents whose youngest child is a 
particular age over time, including the serial correlation between lone parents observed at different 
times. 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) show that, while this technique yields standard errors 
that give correct inference when the number of clusters is large, the standard errors are still likely 
to be biased downwards if there are only a small number of clusters (as is the case here), meaning 
that the common trends assumption will be over-rejected. This is because with few clusters 
either the serial correlation or the correlation between individuals in a particular cluster will be 
underestimated. There are ways in which this bias can be corrected which could be investigated 
further and implemented by an eventual IA.15 These methods are at the cutting-edge of modern 
12 It is also possible that the shocks are common to parents with children born in a particular 
time period. We find this a little less plausible. In any case, such a situation would be easier to 
deal with than a situation when shocks are common to parents with children of a given age, 
because the actual policy impacts should vary with the age (not date of birth) of the children. 
Cameron et	al. (2010) offers a suggestion on what to do if data is subject to clustering in more 
than one dimension, but these methods may not be appropriate in a case like ours where the 
groups sizes are small.
13 Also, in a panel model where the same lone parents are tracked over time, it is possible that 
the error terms of particular cohorts of lone parents (where cohorts are defined as all lone 
parents whose youngest child was born in the same month) will have a common component, 
and that this common error component will be serially correlated over time. This could be 
similarly dealt with by ‘clustering’ standard errors at the cohort level.
14 This method was first suggested by Arellano, M. (1987).
15 For example, Bell and McCaffrey (2002) present a method of adjusting standard errors 
obtained from clustering by a method known as bias-reduced linearisation. Cameron et	al. 
(2008) show that several bootstrap methods work well with small numbers of clusters.
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econometrics, and the literature has not yet come to a consensus on the best way in which to 
correct for such bias; any eventual impact assessment should examine the ways in which standard 
errors could be adjusted to take account of this bias. 
3.5.3 Assessing the suitability of DiD with lone parents with younger children  
 as a comparison group: analysis using linear regression
This section reports the results of implementing the pre-programme tests with linear regression 
methods, and where standard errors were clustered at the level of the group (see Section 3.5.2). 
The analysis in Section 3.5.1 was based on sampling lone parents with differently aged youngest 
children, and tracking their outcomes for three years, having split the lone parents whose children 
were old enough for them to be affected by the hypothetical LPPC, into three groups (those whose 
youngest child was aged 12 to 15, ten to 11 and seven to nine). In this section, separate regressions 
are run for each phase of the LPPC. 
The precise procedure for selecting the sample for each regression was as follows:
• lone parents were sampled who are on IS on each of 1 April 2001, 2002, 2003 or 2004;16
• for each phase, lone parents were selected whose youngest child is the same age (in months) 
as those lone parents who will be affected by that phase of the LPPC, as were those lone parents 
whose youngest child is the same age as those lone parents in the suggested comparison group 
for that phase. For example, to form a sample for a regression for the Phase 1a stock, lone parents 
were sampled whose youngest child is aged between 14 years two months and 15 years 11 
months on the day the hypothetical LPPC is introduced, as are those whose youngest child is aged 
between two years two months and three years 11 months (the suggested comparison group for 
eventual impact assessment of this phase) on the same day;
• the outcomes of interest are whether they are on an out-of-work benefit (that is to say IS, JSA or 
IB) three years after initially sampled on IS, whether they are in work (according to the measure in 
the WPLS) on the same day, what proportion of the three years after they are initially sampled on 
IS they spend on an out-of-work benefit (defined as above), and what proportion of this time they 
spend in work (according to the measure in the WPLS). 
The regression estimated were as follows:
 y
it
 = Σ αt + γG + Σ Δt. Dit + X tit β + vGt + εit       (16)
t          t
             
This is similar to equation (15) except that it is amended to allow for more than two time periods. 
There are now multiple time effects and multiple group-time effects; these allow the common 
trends assumption to be tested by comparing outcomes of the 2001 cohort with those who are 
initially sampled in each of 2002, 2003 and 2004. Essentially, the 2001 cohort is treated as the 
group unaffected by any hypothetical LPPCs, and the subsequent cohorts are treated as affected  
by a hypothetical LPPC.
The tables that follow report the time effects (represented by dummy variables for each cohort, 
αt), group effects (represented by a dummy variable for those lone parents who are affected by the 
hypothetical LPPC, γ
G
) and group-time effects. Each regression corresponds to a particular phase of 
the LPPC. The coefficients on the other demographic variables are not reported (represented by the 
vector β), but each regression included local area variables from different sources, information on 
16 We dropped the 1 April 2005 sample as we do not observe them for a full three years in our 
data (which stops on 31 March 2007).
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individual lone parents reported in the WPLS, and various policy variables. 
The local area variables included are:
• local employment rates from the 2001 census;
• index of multiple deprivation (IMD) scores, childcare availability;
• the qualifications of lone parents who are unemployed from the 2001 census; and
• tenure variables for lone parents from the 2001 census.
The variables from the WPLS are:
• number of children;
• sex;
• age of youngest child (linearly);
• initial benefit amount;
• history variables – amount of time in the 18 months prior to initial sampling spent in work, and 
amount of time in the 18 months prior to initial sampling spent on benefit;
• whether a lone parent is entitled to a disability premium at the point they are sampled or at some 
point in the past;
• whether a lone parent is simultaneously claiming another benefit at the same time as IS (IB, 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA), Attendance Allowance (AA), Carer’s Allowance, Bereavement 
Benefit or Widows Benefit); and
• whether a lone parent has participated in the New Deal for Lone Parents. 
Dummy variables to take into account whether lone parents are affected by the following policies 
were also included:
• WFIs;17
• Quarterly WFIs (QWFIs) for all lone parents whose youngest child is aged 14 or over;
• Extended Schools Quarterly WFIs for lone parents whose youngest child is aged 12 or over in 
areas where Extended Schools Childcare is operating;
• the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents; and
• In-Work Credit (IWC).
As discussed in Section 3.5.2, it should be noted that the researchers believe the standard errors 
being used in this analysis are probably downward-biased (i.e. too small) because standard errors 
were clustered by group, and there are only a small number of groups. This bias may lead one 
to judge incorrectly that coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero, and thus 
incorrectly rejecting the common trends assumption. 
17 These were rolled out by age of youngest child between April 2001 and April 2004, during the 
period we study here. There is a danger that any differential trend between lone parents with 
differently aged youngest children is in fact picking up the effect of WFIs on lone parents with 
younger children. Assuming that the effect of WFIs is the same over time, allowing for more 
than two time periods should enable us to separately identify the effect of WFIs from the 
common trend.
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Tables 3.2 to 3.4 show that, for the outcome of being off benefit three years after initial sampling 
(two years after the hypothetical LPPC was introduced), some of the parameters that test whether 
the common trends assumption fails are statistically significant at the one per cent level, and some 
of these deviations from the common trends assumption are large, particularly when comparing 
lone parents whose youngest children are aged 12 or over with the chosen comparison group.18 
There is, therefore, substantial evidence that the common trends assumption did not hold during 
this period, as the divergences from this assumption during the pre-programme period were both 
large and statistically significantly different from zero. However, two caveats to this finding are 
needed: First, most of the parameters are small in magnitude (around one percentage point), 
meaning that estimates of the effect of the LPPC would be subject to this degree of inaccuracy had 
it been introduced during this period, and are not significantly different from zero at the one per  
cent level. Second, as discussed in Section 3.5.2, the standard errors will be biased downwards due 
to the small number of clusters, meaning that the common trends assumption could be being 
incorrectly rejected. 
Looking at the other parameters in the model, there is some evidence that outcomes improved over 
the period in question, as the α parameters are large and positive, and that outcomes were better 
for lone parents with older children, as γ
G
 is large and positive in most models. 
For the other benefit outcome - the proportion of time lone parents spend on benefit in the three 
years after they are initially sampled on IS – Tables 3.5 to 3.7 show that there are fewer instances of 
the common trends assumption being rejected at the one per cent significance level. The deviations 
from common trends also tend to be smaller (at typically less than one percentage point). Again, 
outcomes for both groups tended to improve over time, and lone parents with older children tended 
to have better outcomes. 
18 The one per cent significance criterion is, arguably, the correct one to use in this instance 
(rather than the conventional five per cent criterion): the sample sizes are so large that 
the power of the statistical tests being carried out is large (that is to say, the chance of not 
rejecting the common trends assumption when it does not in fact hold is small) even when a 
higher significance level is used. In choosing which significance level to use, we have to make 
a trade-off between making Type I and Type II errors. A Type I error occurs when we reject 
a hypothesis that is true. In this instance, this would mean rejecting the common trends 
assumption when this is a reasonable assumption. This is less likely to occur when we use a 
low significance criterion (i.e. one per cent rather than five per cent). A Type II error occurs 
when we fail to reject a hypothesis that is false. In this instance, this would mean not rejecting 
the common trends assumption when it does not hold. This is more likely to occur when we 
use a low significance criterion. Increasing sample size reduces the probability of making a 
Type II error, but does not change the probability of making a Type I error. It is, therefore, 
sensible when working with a large sample to reduce the significance criterion, as this allows 
us to use the increased sample size to lower the probability of both types of error. 
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Table 3.2 Outcome: off benefit three years after initially observed on IS,  
 Phase 1
Phase 1a stock Phase 1a flow Phase 1b stock Phase 1b flow
γ
G 7.8 -82.2** 2.8 17.2**
Δ2002 1.0* 1.2** 1.1** -0.1
Δ2003 -0.3 3.1*** 1.0*** 1.3*
Δ2004 -0.4*** 2.1*** 0 -1.2*
α2002 0.9 1.7* 1.2** 2.1**
α2003 1.5 1.8 2.1** 2.1*
α2004 2.5 3.0* 3.2** 3.5*
Observations 988,581 335,461 868,803 215,366
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Table 3.3 Outcome: off benefit three years after initially observed on IS,  
 Phase 2
Phase 2a stock Phase 2a flow Phase 2b stock Phase 2b flow
γ
G 3.2 11.8*** -8.1** -5.7
Δ2002 0.7** 0.7*** 1.1** 1.2***
Δ2003 0.3* 0.8*** 0.4** 1.0***
Δ2004 -1.2* -1.3** -1.0** -0.2
α2002 1.4 1.9** 1.6* 2.3*
α2003 2.5 2.2* 2.5* 2.3*
α2004 3.6 3.6* 3.8* 3.8
Observations 43,796 345,715 375,190 177,808
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
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Table 3.4 Outcome: off benefit three years after initially observed on IS,  
 Phase 3
Phase 3a stock Phase 3a flow Phase 3b stock Phase 3b flow
γ
G 1.1 4.4** 4.5** 7.9**
Δ2002 0.9*** -0.6*** 1.9** 1.3***
Δ2003 -0.6** -0.2** 1.8*** 1.3**
Δ2004 -1.4** -1.4** 0.3* -0.1
α2002 1.4 1.8* 1.3* 1.8*
α2003 2.6 2.2* 2.4* 2.2*
α2004 3.8 3.7 3.5* 3.6*
Observations 573,446 564,741 710,385 608,520
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Table 3.5 Outcome: proportion of three years spent off benefit, Phase 1
Phase 1a stock Phase 1a flow Phase 1b stock Phase 1b flow
γ
G -23.4** -1 4.1* 9.7**
Δ2002 0.8*** 0.6** 1.0* 0.4*
Δ2003 0.1 0.5 0.9*** 0.7**
Δ2004 -0.3 0 0 -0.7*
α2002 -0.3** 0.2*** -0.1 0.3
α2003 0.1** 0.4** 0.6 0.7
α2004 1.5** 1.6*** 1.8 2.1
Observations 988,581 335,461 868,803 215,366
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
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Table 3.6 Outcome: proportion of three years spent off benefit, Phase 2
Phase 2a stock Phase 2a flow Phase 2b stock Phase 2b flow
γ
G 1.1 7.7** -2.6* -0.3
Δ2002 0.8** 0.9** 1.0** 0.9**
Δ2003 0.6** 1.0** 0.7** 0.7**
Δ2004 -0.6** -0.1* -0.1* 0
α2002 0 0.3 0.1 0.5
α2003 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9
α2004 2.1 1.9 2 2.2
Observations 643,796 345,715 375,190 177,808
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Table 3.7 Outcome: proportion of three years spent off benefit, Phase 3
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Phase 3a stock Phase 3a flow Phase 3b stock Phase 3b flow
γ
G 3.1** 4.2** 3.3** 6.6***
Δ2002 0.7** -0.3* 1.1** 0.8**
Δ2003 -0.2 0.0 1.5** 1.0***
Δ2004 -0.6** -0.6** 0.2* 0.0
α2002 0 0.2 -0.1 0.2
α2003 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
α2004 2.1 2 1.9 1.8
Observations 573,446 564,741 710,385 608,520
Tables 3.8 to 3.10 look at whether a lone parent is in work three years after they are initially 
observed on IS. They show that work outcomes tend to be better for lone parents with older 
children, and that outcomes in later periods tend to be better (at least when comparing the group 
that would be affected by the third phase of the LPO roll-out). Most deviations from the common 
trends assumption tend to be less than one percentage point in magnitude, although some are 
larger (but all are less than two percentage points). The common trends assumption is again 
rejected at the one per cent level in a few instances. Generally, outcomes for lone parents with older 
children tended to improve relative to those with younger children between 2001 and 2003, but 
then fell back relative to those of lone parents with older children in 2004. 
Finally, Tables 3.11 to 3.13 look at the proportion of time spent in work during the three years after 
lone parents are initially sampled on IS. Deviations from common trends are relatively large at 
between one and two percentage points (although generally lower for Phase 3, where the treatment 
and comparison groups are closer in terms of the age of their youngest child) and the common 
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trends assumption is rejected at the one per cent level in a few instances. Outcomes were better 
for lone parents with older children during the period in question, and that outcomes for lone 
parents with older children tended to improve relative to those of lone parents with younger children 
between 2001 and 2003, but then fell in 2004.19
Table 3.8 Outcome: in work three years after initially observed on IS, Phase 1
Phase 1a stock Phase 1a flow Phase 1b stock Phase 1b flow
γ
G 8.0 -14.2* 6.5* 10.3***
Δ2002 1.3** 0.8** 0.7 0.0
Δ2003 -0.3 0.4 1.6** 0.7*
Δ2004 -1.7* -1.2* 0.0 -1.6***
α2002 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.4*
α2003 0.0 -0.7 0.1* -0.5**
α2004 0.6 -0.2 0.7 0.0
Observations 988,581 335,461 868,803 215,366
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Table 3.9 Outcome: in work three years after initially observed on IS, Phase 2
Phase 2a stock Phase 2a flow Phase 2b stock Phase 2b flow
γ
G 6.7* 5.8** -2.8 14.4
Δ2002 0.2 0.9** 0.2 0.4
Δ2003 -0.2 1.0* 0.4 0.3
Δ2004 -1.9*** -0.8* -1.1* -0.7**
α2002 0.3 0.6** 0.4 0.2
α2003 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
α2004 0.9 0.5 0.6 -0.1
Observations 643,796 345,715 375,190 177,808
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
19 These dates all refer to the years in which the lone parents are initially observed on IS.
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Table 3.10 Outcome: in work three years after initially observed on IS, Phase 3
Phase 3a stock Phase 3a flow Phase 3b stock Phase 3b flow
γ
G 4.5** 4.6** 4.4*** 8.0***
Δ2002 0.1 -0.3 0.9* 0.7*
Δ2003 -0.2 0.2 1.3* 1.5*
Δ2004 -1.7** -1.1* -0.4** -0.1
α2002 0.3* 0.4 0.2** 0.4**
α2003 0 -0.4* 0 -0.4**
α2004 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.3
Observations 573,446 564,741 710,385 608,520
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Table 3.11 Outcome: proportion of three years spent in work, Phase 1
Phase 1a stock Phase 1a flow Phase 1b stock Phase 1b flow
γ
G -0.2 3.8 5.1* 5.6***
Δ2002 1.6** 0.8* 1.4* 0.6*
Δ2003 1.1 1.2 2.3** 1.9**
Δ2004 -0.8 -1.1* 0.0 -0.8***
α2002 -1.7** -0.8* -1.5** -0.8***
α2003 -1.2*** -1.3* -1.0* -1.3**
α2004 0.9** 1.0* 1.2 1.0
Observations 988,581 335,461 868,803 215,366
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
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Table 3.12 Outcome: proportion of three years spent in work, Phase 2
Phase 2a stock Phase 2a flow Phase 2b stock Phase 2b flow
γ
G 3.4 -2.6* 0.9 10.1
Δ2002 1.0* 0.9** 1.1** 0.6
Δ2003 1.4* 1.9** 1.8** 1.3*
Δ2004 -1.0*** -0.6* -0.3 -0.7***
α2002 -1.2** -0.7* -1.1** -0.7*
α2003 -1 -1.1 -1.4* -1.0***
α2004 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1
Observations 643,796 345,715 375,190 177,808
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
Table 3.13 Outcome: proportion of three years spent in work, Phase 3
Phase 3a stock Phase 3a flow Phase 3b stock Phase 3b flow
γ
G 5.0** 4.5** 4.0*** 7.1***
Δ2002 0.9* 0.4 0.9* 0.6*
Δ2003 1.2* 1.3* 2.0** 1.9**
Δ2004 -0.8** -0.7* -0.2** -0.2*
α2002 -1.2*** -0.9** -1.2** -0.8***
α2003 -1.2* -1.2*** -1.1** -1.2**
α2004 1.3 1.2 1.2* 1.2
Observations 573,446 564,741 710,385 608,520
Notes: 
* significant at the ten per cent level. 
** at the five per cent level.  
*** at the one per cent level. Parameters as defined in equation (16). 
3.5.4 Overall assessment of the suitability of the DiD method, using lone  
 parents with younger children as a comparison group
Section 3.5.3 shows that there is evidence that the common trends assumption did not hold during 
the period from 2001 to 2007. However, it is the assessment of the researchers that an impact 
assessment using the DiD methodology could be informative in telling us about the effect of the 
LPPC on those directly affected, for the following reasons. 
First, there are some important points to note about the pre-programme tests in Section 3.5.3:
• the standard errors used will probably be biased downwards (i.e. too small) due to the small 
number of clusters in the model, meaning that the common trends assumption could be being 
incorrectly rejected;
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• even with this likely bias, most of the parameters tested are not significantly different from zero at 
the one per cent level;
• where there are statistically significant divergences, most are small in magnitude, at less than one 
percentage point.
Second, an IA that used the DiD methodology could be amended to reflect the evidence of a pre-
existing deteriorating trend in outcomes among lone parents with older children by using a trend-
adjusted DiD method, as discussed in Section 3.3.1 (this would be equivalent to exploring whether 
the estimated impacts are robust to changing the model specification in order to take account of 
the apparent deteriorating trend in outcomes among lone parents with older children). When doing 
this, it would help if as long a period of pre-programme data as possible is used.
Ultimately, though, the suitability of this approach depends on the size of impact that an eventual 
IA is expected to find (or the questions which policy-makers most want answering): if the impact 
of the LPPC is expected to be smaller than the two percentage points by which the trends of the 
treatment and comparison groups diverge during the pre-programme period, then it seems unlikely 
that such impacts could be detected reliably. But if an eventual IA is intended to test whether the 
LPPC had impacts as large as five or ten percentage points (compared with no effect), then the DiD 
method (and the trend-adjusted DiD method) could provide robust conclusions.
Finally, it should be noted that even if the common trends assumption was considered reasonable 
during the period from 2001 to 2007, this is no guarantee that it would have continued to hold after 
the LPPC was introduced in the absence of any policy change. This is of particular concern in this 
instance as the period considered ended some time before the start of the recession into which the 
LPPC was introduced.
3.6 Summary
This chapter has argued that:
• the recommended empirical strategy is to use a DiD approach. This will compare the outcomes 
of lone parents directly affected by the LPPC with those of lone parents whose children are 
sufficiently young so that they are not affected; this comparison will then itself be compared to 
the difference in outcomes of similar groups of lone parents observed before the LPPCs. The idea 
is that differences in outcomes of lone parents with differently aged youngest children before 
the LPPC begins are informative about what the differences in outcomes of lone parents with 
differently aged youngest children would have been in the absence of the LPPC;
• there is a trade-off between examining outcomes for a longer period of time, or allowing for 
longer anticipation effects, and reducing the difference between the treatment and comparison 
groups in terms of the age of the youngest child. For some of the early phases of the roll-out, the 
difference in ages of the treatment and comparison groups will be large;
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• the key assumption needed for a DiD estimate to be valid is known as the common trends 
assumption. In the case of the LPPC, common trends would fail if the labour market behaviour 
of lone parents with younger children changed in a way which was different from the change 
in the labour market behaviour of lone parents with older children. There is some evidence 
that the common trends assumption did not hold during the period from 2001 to 2007. But 
the divergences are usually small, and may not be statistically significant, and they could be 
accounted for by using a trend-adjusted DiD model. However, even if this assumption holds in the 
pre-programme period, there is no guarantee that it will still hold after the LPPC is introduced. A 
particular concern for this IA is that the LPPC is being implemented during a recession, and there 
is no pre-programme data to test whether common trends held during previous recessions. Over 
and above this, though, the main threats to the DiD approach are anticipation effects, and the 
impact of other contemporaneous policy changes, and these are discussed in Chapter 6;
• naïve analysis using the DiD method often produces estimated standard errors which are too 
small, and the conventional ways of addressing these (with clustered standard errors) may not 
be appropriate in the particular case of the LPPC. An eventual impact assessment should examine 
the ways in which standard errors can be estimated correctly in this situation, but it should be 
noted that these methods are at the cutting-edge of modern econometrics and the literature has 
not yet come to a consensus;
• the overall assessment of the research team is that, if the actual impact of LPPC is expected to be 
smaller than two percentage points, then it seems unlikely that such impacts could be detected 
reliably. But if an eventual IA is intended to test whether the LPPC had impacts as large as five 
to ten percentage points (compared with no effect), then a DiD or a trend-adjusted DiD model 
should provide robust answers.
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4 The empirical approach:  
 further refinements and  
 detailed considerations
This chapter discusses some elaborations to the basic difference-in-difference (DiD) approach: 
Section 4.1 discusses what more can be gained by using a duration model, Section 4.2 discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of evaluating the impact of the roll-out compared with the steady-
state policy and Section 4.3 discusses why the impact assessment (IA) will not be able to estimate 
the separate impact of the different elements of the lone parent policy change (LPPC) (although it 
will be able to provide a profile of the impacts over time).
4.1 Dynamic selection and duration models
The research team believe that a version of the DiD methodology is an appropriate method for 
estimating the overall effect of the LPPC on one population of interest (lone parents who are 
receiving Income Support (IS) as the treatment starts, as discussed above). A future IA may, 
however, wish to estimate particular impacts that, by their nature, introduce further selection 
problems. Specifically, there may be an interest in examining outcomes for sub-groups of lone 
parents, where these sub-groups are defined by the choices that they make: the most obvious would 
be employment-contingent outcomes for those who enter work.
For example, suppose a future IA aims to estimate the effect of the LPPC on the duration of 
subsequent employment spells amongst lone parents previously on IS. Further suppose that one 
could find a comparison group of lone parents on IS that is, on average, just like the treatment 
group (this is what a randomised trial would deliver). This would allow us to estimate the effect 
of the LPPC on the transition into work by a straightforward comparison of means. However, this 
would not allow us to estimate the effect of the LPPC on subsequent employment durations. The 
reason is as follows: if the original treatment group and comparison group are, on average, the 
same but the LPPC leads to a larger fraction of the treatment group gaining employment, then the 
employed treatment group members will not necessarily be the same, on average, as the employed 
comparison group members. 
Although some of these differences can be reflected in the data on individuals (i.e., it is observable), 
some of it may not (i.e. it is unobservable). For example, suppose that the key unobserved 
characteristic is intrinsic motivation: the most motivated find employment. Intrinsic motivation 
varies across individuals, but is on average the same in the treatment and comparison group (that 
is what makes it a good comparison group). Suppose that the X% most motivated lone parents in 
the comparison group find work, and the Y% most motivated individuals in the treatment group find 
work; because the treatment raises motivation and job-finding probabilities, Y should be greater 
than X. The average intrinsic motivation of employed members of the treatment group will then not 
(in general) be equal to that of the employed members of the comparison group: if the treatment 
provides additional motivation to find work, then individuals in the treatment group with lower 
intrinsic motivation will find work, and this in turn means that the average intrinsic motivation 
among employed members of the treatment group will be lower than the average intrinsic 
motivation of employment members of the comparison group. A simple comparison of employment 
durations between the treatment group and comparison group would confound the true effect 
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of the policy on employment durations with these differences in the intrinsic motivation of the 
employed members of the two groups (and usually lead to an estimate of the treatment effect 
which is too small).
This is an example of a dynamic selection problem (Ham and Lalonde, 1996). Initial randomisation – 
or the initial suitability of the comparison group – breaks down if researchers wish to study dynamic 
outcomes, such as the duration of subsequent spells of employment and non-employment. The DiD 
estimator, and elaborations of that estimator, typically cannot overcome such dynamic selection 
problems. Instead, researchers have to model explicitly the way that outcomes depend both on 
treatment status and unobserved characteristics of treated and untreated individuals. This can 
be done in a duration (or survivor) model. This will typically involve making stronger assumptions 
about functional form and the nature of the unobserved heterogeneity than in a conventional DiD 
estimator, but these stronger assumptions will allow us to make richer statements about the impact 
of the programme. For example, rather than just determining the overall effect on employment 
rates, researchers will be able to parse such effects into impacts on job finding rates and on job 
durations. It will also allow us to separate people affected by the programme into the marginals – 
those people who are induced to change behaviour – and non-marginals – those whose behaviour 
was unaffected. Having data with multiple spells for individuals allows for slightly less strong 
assumptions about the nature of the unobserved heterogeneity.
There is a wide literature using duration models to examine the effect of additional obligations on 
the length of benefit claims (an early example for the UK is Dolton and O’Neill (1996)). It is also 
possible to control for dynamic selection bias in order to examine subsequent work outcomes, 
as Ham and Lalonde (1996) show, looking at work outcomes of women after they participate in 
training schemes. Other examples include Card and Hyslop (2005), who use a duration model to 
estimate the impact of a time-limited work subsidy for lone parents on welfare in Canada (similar 
to In-Work Credit (IWC)), and Bewley et	al. (2008), which was part of the impact assessment of 
Pathways to Work. Researchers at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) have recently been working on 
such a model, results from which form part of the draft report on the LPP pilots20.
Typically (but not always), duration models examine transitions between mutually exclusive states. 
In the case of the LPPC, the states of interest could be:
• receiving an out-of-work benefit;
• not receiving an out-of-work benefit and in work for at least 16 hours per week; and
• not receiving an out-of-work benefit and working for fewer than 16 hours per week (including not 
working at all).
A duration model is based on data on transitions from one state to another: in this model, there 
would be three states and hence six possible transitions. A more complicated model would 
expand the out-of-work benefit state to reflect whether lone parents were claiming IS, Jobseeker's 
Allowance (JSA) or Incapacity Benefit (IB), increasing the number of states to five and the number of 
transitions that needed to be modelled to 16. The likelihood of lone parents making these transitions 
would be modelled as a function of observable and unobservable characteristics, as well as being 
affected by the LPPC. 
20 Brewer et	al (2009).
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A duration model can control for dynamic selection bias by explicitly modelling the unobserved 
differences between lone parents that lead to the dynamic selection bias. The form that these 
unobserved differences take would have to be specified in a parametric duration model, but the 
fact that they would be correlated for a given lone parent over time, including when they were in 
different states, would mean that – given the assumptions of the model – the impact of dynamic 
selection bias could be separated from the genuine effect of the LPPC.
4.2 Estimating the impact of the roll-out of the lone parent  
 policy change as well as the steady-state
In principle, it is feasible to estimate the impact of the roll-out policy using the methods described  
in Section 3.3. As that explained, the fact that there are many different groups of lone parents  
(ie the different phases of the roll-out) affected by policy changes at different times means that a 
simple DiD estimator (which allows for two groups – those affected and those unaffected by a  
policy change – and two time periods – before and after a policy change) would be inappropriate. 
But it is easy to modify the DiD estimator to incorporate several dates on which policy changes, and 
several groups. 
There are certain features that make it more attractive to estimate the impact of the roll-out than 
the steady-state:
• Because the roll-out features policy changes for different groups of lone parents (or the different 
phases) on different dates, estimates of the impact of the roll-out based on the DiD method 
should be more robust to failures of the common trends assumption due to group-specific shocks. 
For example, if, hypothetically, there was a single implementation date for the LPPC, and lone 
parents with younger children started to have better outcomes just as the LPPC was implemented, 
and those with older children did not – due to some change in the economy – then a DiD 
estimator would give an underestimate of the impact of the LPPC. In reality, there is more than 
one implementation date, so even if the common trends assumption was violated in this way,  
the DiD estimate would underestimate the impact on one phase of the roll-out, but there would 
not necessarily be a problem with the impact on other phases.
• Anticipation effects – over those already allowed for by the DiD estimator – should be less of a 
problem during the roll-out than the steady-state, because the policy has been in existence for 
less time (which places an absolute limit on anticipation effects), and because any peer effects 
will be relatively small. In the steady-state though, lone parents may know about the LPPC a long 
time before they are themselves affected by it, giving a greater scope for anticipation effects.
• An IA of the steady-state has the problem that lone parents may be affected by the LPPC more 
than once, particularly if they have another child after they first lose their entitlement to IS. This 
might mean that some lone parents in the comparison group have been affected by the LPPC, 
which might violate the common trends assumption.
• Some of the other policy changes (discussed in Section 6.2) will not have been implemented 
during the roll-out.
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But there are some features that make it less attractive to estimate the impact of the roll-out than 
the steady-state:
• As discussed in Section 5.5, working out exactly when lone parents will lose entitlement to IS 
is more complicated in the roll-out than in the steady-state, because it depends on the date of 
Work Focused Interviews (WFIs), for some phases. If an estimate made by researchers of when 
lone parents will lose their entitlement to IS (based on the information available to them in the 
Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS)) is inaccurate, or if the implementation of the 
roll-out of the LPPC differs from the plans (and no systematic information is available on these 
discrepancies), then this will introduce some measurement error, and reduce the accuracy of 
estimates of the impact of the roll-out. By comparison, the relative simplicity of the steady-state 
rules, and the fact that there will be fewer lone parents making the transition from IS to JSA each 
month in the steady-state, make it more likely both that the exact conditions of the LPPC can be 
replicated in the WPLS, and that the implementation of the LPPC is as planned.
• As discussed in Section 3.4, the treatment and comparison groups during the roll-out will have a 
larger difference in the age of youngest child than in the steady-state.
On balance, though, the first set of arguments seem more significant than the second set, and so 
the internal validity of estimates of the LPPC from the roll-out is likely to be greater than those based 
on the steady-state.
However, it must be recognised that the impact of the roll-out of the LPPC is likely to be different 
from the impact of the steady-state of the LPPC for the following reasons:
• the roll-out affects different groups of lone parents (i.e. those whose youngest child is older) 
than the steady-state, and there is no reason why the impact of the LPPC should be the same 
on lone parents receiving IS regardless of the age of their youngest child. The roll-out, therefore, 
represents the only opportunity to estimate the impact on the LPPC on lone parents whose 
youngest child is aged 12 or more;
• the roll-out will take place at a different time (and therefore, under different economic conditions) 
from the steady-state. For example, the fact that the first phases of the roll-out are being 
implemented at a time when employment is falling and unemployment rising (and rising fast) 
may mean that, even if the LPPC is successful in increasing labour supply, there may not be 
enough labour demand, meaning that there might be no impact on work outcomes (Section 3.3 
discussed what implication the recession has on the internal validity of a DiD estimator);
• the roll-out of LPPC might be implemented differently from the steady-state. In particular, given 
the considerable recent rise in JSA claimants, one might expect that Jobcentre Plus advisers would 
have less time to help lone parents during the early phases of the roll-out than they might in the 
steady-state;
• the LPPC may cause cultural changes among lone parents that happen some time after the LPPC 
is first introduced. These could not then be picked up by an IA of the roll-out, but would be in any 
IA of the steady-state.
In other words, the external validity of the estimates of the LPPC based on the roll-out may be 
lower than those based on the steady-state. But whether these represent significant disadvantages 
depends on whether there is interest in understanding the impact of the roll-out in itself, rather  
than merely using the estimates from the roll-out as a guide to the likely impact of the steady- 
state policy. 
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This report was asked to consider the feasibility of estimating the impact of the roll-out. The 
research team believe it is feasible, but just because something is feasible does not mean that it 
should be done. There are, of course, various benefits from estimating the impact of the roll-out 
which should be compared with the cost of undertaking it. One major benefit is that estimates of 
the impact of the roll-out would be available significantly earlier than estimates of the impact of the 
steady-state policy. 
4.3 Separating the impact of the different elements of the lone  
 parent policy change
An eventual IA based on the DiD method will be able to estimate the impact of the LPPC on 
individual lone parents at different points in time, measuring ‘time’ relative to the date at which the 
lone parent loses eligibility to IS as a lone parent. It cannot, however, determine which elements of 
the LPPC are causing these impacts. 
It might seem reasonable to call the impacts measured after the date at which the lone parent 
lost eligibility to IS as ‘after effects’, to call impacts measured during the 12 months leading up to 
losing eligibility to IS as ‘pre-employment support impacts’, and to call impacts measured more 
than 12 months before losing eligibility to IS as ‘anticipation effects’, these should be thought of 
only as suggestive labels, rather than the outcome of a precise decomposition (the only thing for 
certain is that any impacts on lone parents before they are affected by any aspect of the LPPC were 
‘anticipation effects’). For example, it would not be possible to separate formally any impact of the 
LPPC on lone parents in the 12 months leading up to losing eligibility to IS between that genuinely 
due to the support elements, and that due to the anticipation of losing entitlement to IS, and 
it would not be possible to separate any impact of the LPPC on lone parents after they had lost 
entitlement to IS into that due to pre-employment support and that due to in-work support. 
A related question is whether the IA could separate the impact of different elements of the pre-
employment and in-work support. Prerequisites for achieving this would be variation between lone 
parents in which services were received, and accurate data merged into the WPLS about which 
lone parents received which elements. The research team are currently unsure whether such 
administrative data will be available to researchers, but even if it was, and there was variation 
between lone parents in which services/elements were received/accessed, using such variation 
could not reliably infer the different impacts of different elements of LPPC. The reasoning behind 
this conclusion is identical to that which has led other authors to argue that it is not possible to 
distinguish between the different aspects of the Pathways to Work package. Adam et	al. (2009) 
investigated whether one could separate the impact of the Choices package from that of other 
aspects of Pathways to Work, and concluded that:
‘…[P]articipation	in	Choices	is	voluntary,	so	it	is	difficult	to	know	how	far	different	outcomes	for	
participants	and	non-participants	are	caused	by	Choices	and	how	far	they	reflect	pre-existing	
differences	in	the	type	of	people	who	choose	to	participate.	Using	propensity	score	matching	
techniques,	we	account	for	differences	between	participants	and	non-participants	in	a	very	
large	set	of	background	characteristics;	we	thus	compare	outcomes	for	Choices	participants	
with	those	for	non-Choices	participants	who	are	observably	similar	in	many	dimensions.	But	it	
remains	likely	that	there	are	important	differences	in	the	unobserved	characteristics	of	the	two	
groups,	and	it	is	impossible	to	know	how	far	the	difference	in	outcomes	between	the	two	groups	
is	a	result	of	these	unobserved	pre-existing	differences	rather	than	a	result	of	participating	in	
Choices.’	
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The authors say that this reflects ‘the	intrinsic	difficulty	of	evaluating	programmes	based	on	voluntary	
participation	when	there	is	no	exogenous	variation	in	the	availability	of	the	programme’. Exactly 
the same argument applies to the LPPC: because all elements of the LPPC are available to all lone 
parents about to lose their entitlement to IS, any variation between lone parents in which services 
were accessed will reflect choices made by individual lone parents and their personal advisers, 
and it is likely that these choices reflect existing differences between lone parents, and that these 
differences themselves will partially determine subsequent outcomes.
In the absence of variation in the availability of the different elements of the LPPC, no quantitative 
method could formally separate the overall impact of the LPPC into that due to anticipation effects, 
support effects and after effects, or separate the different elements of the support package. This 
would remain the case even were additional data to the WPLS available. Therefore, any IA of 
the LPPC would give a single estimate of the effect of the whole of the LPPC. It is possible that 
qualitative research could be informative on this, but this would depend on how well lone parents 
are able to distinguish between the different parts of the LPPC, and how well they could consider 
how they would have behaved in the absence of one or more of them.
4.4 Summary
This chapter has argued that:
• estimating the impact of the LPPC on work-contingent outcomes (such as earnings or job 
retention) of lone parents is more difficult than estimating the impact on, say, initial flows 
off benefit. This is because if the LPPC led to a larger fraction of the treatment group gaining 
employment, then the employed treatment group members will not necessarily be the same, on 
average, as the employed comparison group members, and a simple comparison would confound 
the true effect of the policy with the differences in the employed members of the two groups, 
and usually lead to an estimate of the treatment effect which is too small. This is an example 
of a dynamic selection problem. The DiD estimator, and elaborations of that estimator, typically 
cannot overcome such dynamic selection problems, but duration models can be estimated in a 
way which may control for dynamic selection bias;
• there are different problems to contend with when examining the impact of the roll-out and the 
steady-state policy. On balance, the internal validity of estimates based on the roll-out is probably 
higher than those based on the steady-state, but estimates of the roll-out of the LPPC may be 
different from (and therefore, a poor guide to) estimates based on the steady-state. Whether 
these represent significant disadvantages depends on whether there is interest in understanding 
the impact of the roll-out in itself, rather than merely using the estimates from the roll-out as a 
guide to the likely impact of the steady-state policy;
• no quantitative method could robustly separate the overall impact of the LPPC into that due to 
anticipation effects, support effects and after effects, or separate the different elements of the 
support package, even were additional data available in the WPLS. Any IA of the LPPC would give 
an estimate of the effect of the whole of the LPPC.
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5 Outcomes of interest and  
 likely sources of data
This chapter discusses the main sources of data that could be used in an eventual impact 
assessment (IA), and what outcomes it will (and will not) be possible to examine with these 
datasets (Section 5.1). Section 5.2 discusses the problems in estimating the impact of the lone 
parent policy change (LPPC) on new and repeat claimants, Section 5.3 discusses how well an IA 
could inform a cost-benefit analysis, Section 5.4 gives an informal guide as to what impacts could 
be detected accurately using Work and Pensions Longitundinal Study (WPLS) data and Section 5.5 
discusses the technical issue of identifying which lone parents are affected by the LPPC.
5.1 What outcomes could be addressed by an impact  
 assessment?
The main sources of data identified by the research team that are relevant for the eventual IA are 
listed in Table 5.1. There are two types:
• administrative data (ie data held by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) based on 
individuals’ benefit, tax credit, employment and earnings records, and hereafter referred to as  
the WPLS’);
• repeated large-scale household surveys (hereafter referred to as ‘household surveys’). 
These vary in terms of:
• the number of lone parents covered (the sample size);
• which lone parents are covered;
• the variety of data they contain on the population of interest;
• whether they are longitudinal or cross-sectional.
They also vary considerably in their ease of access and use, but this is not discussed further here; it is 
assumed that some way will be found for researchers to access the WPLS in any eventual IA.
Table 5.2 assesses whether an eventual IA would be able to assess the impact of the LPPC on a wide 
range of outcomes. Some general points about Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are:
• the nature of the policy intervention (the LPPC is designed primarily to help and encourage lone 
parents who are receiving out-of-work benefits to move into work) means that longitudinal data 
is a great help, as it allows researchers to identify the directly affected population, and then to 
track their outcomes over time. This is one of the most important strengths of the WPLS. Of the 
longitudinal datasets, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) has too small a sample, and 
Understanding	Society, its successor, will not be informative on the pre-LPPC cohorts; the sample 
size of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) is more promising, but the longitudinal aspect covers only  
15 months of data, meaning only short-run impacts of the LPPC can be estimated from the LFS;
• to be of use in a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework, data needs to be available on a 
comparison group. Given the group suggested in Section 3.3 – lone parents with younger children 
– this means that the LPO Survey will not be able to inform directly the eventual IA. It is, therefore, 
not mentioned in Table 5.2;
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• to be able to identify the directly affected population not already receiving Income Support (IS) 
(see Section 2.3), a dataset needs to sample from the whole population of lone parents, and 
include measures of which benefits lone parents are receiving. This is achieved comprehensively 
only by the household surveys, but Section 5.2 discusses the use of the WPLS to estimate the 
impact of the LPPC on repeat claimants;
• most of the household surveys have sample sizes which will be too small to estimate small 
impacts precisely. It is, therefore, possible that an eventual IA will be unable to show conclusively 
that the LPPC has had any effect at all even if there genuinely is an impact. 
The impact of the LPPC on work entry can be easily measured in a DiD framework for the whole 
directly affected population, but the impact of the LPPC on outcomes of those lone parents who 
enter work – such as on their earnings or duration in employment – can be estimated only if the 
issue of dynamic selection bias is addressed. As discussed in Section 4.1, dynamic selection bias 
arises when examining these outcomes because the LPPC is likely to increase the number of lone 
parents in work and therefore, change the characteristics of lone parents in work. Simply comparing 
lone parents in work after the LPPC has started with those who started work before the LPPC will 
confuse the effects of the LPPC with effects caused by the change in the composition of lone parents 
in work before and after the LPPC is introduced. This problem is a fundamental feature of the nature 
of these outcomes – namely, that they are only observed for the sub-group of the population 
that makes the transition from benefit to work – rather than a result of any limitation in the data 
available. 
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5.2 Estimating the impact of the lone parent policy change  
 on new and repeat claimants
Section 2.3 outlined that lone parents are affected by the LPPC in two ways:
• Group 1: lone parents already on IS, who have their eligibility to receive IS as a lone parent 
removed earlier than it would otherwise have been (DWP refer to this group as ‘existing 
customers’);
• Group 2: lone parents not on IS, some of whom are no longer eligible to start an IS claim if they 
wish to do so.
In order for an IA to analyse the effect of the LPPC on group 2 (lone parents who are no longer 
eligible to claim IS), it is necessary to have data on lone parents who are not claiming an out-of-
work benefit but might start a claim (in other words, it is not sufficient to have data only on those 
lone parents who make a new or repeat claim; it is necessary also to have data on those lone 
parents who could have made, but did not, a new or repeat claim).
The WPLS contains data on all individuals who have claimed a DWP benefit at any point since 1999 
that relates to the time that they are receiving a DWP benefit. By construction, it does not contain 
information on these individuals when they are not on benefit (other than being informative of the 
fact that they are not receiving a DWP benefit). Therefore, it cannot be used to determine which 
individuals are lone parents during periods when they are not receiving a DWP benefit, nor is it 
informative about the age of their youngest child. This clearly makes it impossible to identify which 
former benefit recipients are directly affected by the LPPC by being no longer eligible to claim IS. 
However, if these individuals were still eligible for and claiming tax credits (more than 90 per cent 
of lone parents are eligible for tax credits, and take-up rates are high), then administrative data on 
these individuals should be available through Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC’s) tax credit 
data and contained in the WPLS. If this data was of good quality, it would, therefore, be possible to 
use administrative data to estimate the effect of the LPPC on the probability of lone parents making 
a repeat claim. The reliability of this data could be checked in the following ways:
• how many IWC recipients also appear to start a WTC claim at around the same time as they 
start their IWC claim. This would give some indication as to how reliable eligibility to WTC is as a 
measure of whether a lone parent is in work (because all IWC recipients must be working at least 
16 hours a week, the same condition as for eligibility to WTC);
• how many lone parents starting or ending an IS claim can be tracked before or after (respectively) 
that date using the tax credit data, either as a lone parent or a member of a couple.21
This method would not allow the WPLS to be informative about the impact of the LPPC on new 
claimants, though, because the WPLS only contains data on those individuals who have claimed a 
DWP benefit since 1999. Whether this omission is a problem depends on how many lone parents 
whose youngest child is seven or over have never received a DWP benefit since 1999, and on how 
accurately the tax credit data is at recording who is a lone parent. Calculations, based on the WPLS, 
suggest that, of all claims of IS which were begun by lone parents whose youngest child was aged 
seven or over in 2006/07, 36 per cent of individuals had not previously received IS. This suggests that 
the WPLS will not be informative about the impact of LPPC on new and repeat claimants. 
21 Note that Brewer et	al. (2009) showed that there were more lone parents receiving support for 
their children through either IS or tax credits in 2006/07 than were thought to live in the UK.
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If new claimants did appear to be a significant group, an alternative data source would need to 
be found for this analysis. As Table 5.2 stated, the longitudinal LFS could be used for this purpose: 
this provides data on lone parents’ work and benefit status at quarterly intervals for five quarters. 
Looking at whether lone parents not initially on benefit start a benefit claim in the year they are 
followed would enable an IA to estimate whether the LPPC had any effect on the propensity of 
lone parents to start new (or repeat) benefit claims. This would again use a DiD methodology, 
comparing the proportion of lone parents with children above and below the age limit not on benefit 
starting a new benefit claim before and after the reform. In this case, the difference between the 
treatment and comparison groups in the age of their youngest child would not need to be so large 
because it is less likely that there would be large anticipation effects of the LPPC on this group. The 
only constraint would be that the comparison group should still be eligible for IS at the end of the 
comparison period. Since the comparison period need not be more than a year (as the outcome of 
interest is whether a lone parent starts a new IS claim or not), the difference between the treatment 
and comparison groups in terms of the age of their youngest child should only be  
one year. 
5.3 Substitution, displacement and other issues relevant to a  
 cost-benefit analysis
Table 5.3 shows the research team’s opinion on the feasibility of the IA estimating various outcomes 
that are important for a cost-benefit analysis:
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Table 5.3 Feasibility of estimating various outcomes needed for a cost-benefit  
 analysis
Outcome Feasible to estimate?
Job entry rate IA would estimate change in job entry rate due to LPPC
Benefit exit rate IA would estimate change in benefit exit rate due to LPPC
Cost per additional job Additionality estimate from IA, cost of policy from elsewhere
Cost per additional benefit exit Additionality estimate from IA, cost of policy from elsewhere
Net fiscal benefit from 
additional jobs
Additionality estimate from IA, fiscal benefit per additional job from 
elsewhere 
Net fiscal benefit No
Fiscal benefits/cost ratio No
Net economic benefits No
Impact on earnings in  
non-additional jobs
Dynamic selection bias a problem here; requires duration model. Chapter 5 
discusses whether impact on earnings can be measured accurately
Impact on hours in  
non-additional jobs
Dynamic selection bias a problem here; requires duration model. Chapter 5 
discusses whether impact on hours can be measured accurately
Spells rather than individuals Additionality can be estimated in this way
Deadweight Will estimate additionality, and this allows deadweight to be calculated
Additional time spent in 
employment
IA could estimate additional time in employment due to LPPC
Additional time spent off 
benefit
IA could estimate reduced time on benefit due to LPPC
Job duration WPLS can look at length of employment spells, which are not necessarily 
the same as job spells
Wages LFS (only within 12-month window). Given sample size, would need to have 
large impact to be estimated precisely 
See Appendix A for discussion of measuring earnings in WPLS
Participation in other 
interventions
Can use administrative data to examine effect on participation in NDLP, etc.
Wider impacts No
Substitution and displacement 
effects
No
Sensitivity analysis No
The research team consider that it would not be possible to estimate the impact of the LPPC on 
groups not directly affected by it. Since the LPPC affects all areas of the country at the same time, 
everyone in the country would be potentially affected by substitution and displacement effects 
(whether through employment or wages or prices). This means that there is no obvious group 
who could act as a comparison or comparison group. Methods which have been used in previous 
evaluations are not applicable given the design of the LPPC (see Box 5.1).
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Box 5.1 – Estimating spillover effects in UK welfare-to-work evaluations
The Pathways to Work evaluation (Adam et	al., 2008) examined the effects of that policy on 
claimants of other benefits who were not directly affected by that policy change using a DiD 
approach. This was possible because Pathways to Work was only introduced in some Jobcentre 
Plus districts, and so claimants of other benefits in areas where Pathways to Work was not 
operating could be used as a comparison group (as they could be thought of as operating 
in different labour markets). Since the LPPC is being introduced in all areas of the country 
simultaneously, this strategy could not be pursued in this case. 
Blundell et	al. (2004) attempt to look for spillover effects on the comparison group in a DiD 
evaluation of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) by using a different comparison group that 
they believe is less substitutable for the treatment group in the labour market. They argued that 
if they found a smaller impact of the policy using this alternative comparison group, then that 
would suggest that there were spillover effects that harmed the original comparison group. 
However, using a comparison group that is less similar to the treatment group would make the 
‘common trends’ assumption less believable, threatening the internal validity of the evaluation. 
Blundell et	al. use those who are slightly older than the treatment group as their main 
comparison group, and those who are slightly older again as an alternative comparison group. 
This strategy cannot be pursued for the LPPC because of the inability to distinguish between 
spillover effects and anticipation effects. 
 
Other than this, the eventual IA should be able to come up with the month-by-month estimates of 
the additionality necessary for a cost-benefit analysis to be performed. As discussed in Section 4.1, 
dynamic selection bias becomes a problem when examining the impact of the LPPC on earnings, 
hours and job duration in work, but a duration model would be able to get around this problem 
under various assumptions. 
5.4 How precisely can any impacts be estimated?
DWP officials have estimated how many lone parents will be affected by the different phases of the 
LPPC. Appendix D lists the number who will reach the point where their IS entitlement ends: as it is 
recommended that any IA also examines outcomes in the 12 or 24 months leading up to this point, 
then the sample sizes are likely to be a little larger than this. It shows that the smallest number of 
lone parents affected by any phase is around 10,000. 
But naïve estimates of the size of impact that could be reliably detected with such sample sizes 
are likely to be too optimistic, for the reasons set out in Section 3.5. As that section concludes, the 
assessment of the research team is that the impacts estimated from the WPLC will need to be 
around five to ten percentage points to be considered robust and meaningful. 
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5.5 Identifying which lone parents are affected by the lone  
 parent policy change, and when
Chapter 2.1 noted that not all lone parents lose their entitlement to IS earlier than they otherwise 
would have as a result of LPPC. Some of these groups can be identified using the WPLS (e.g. those 
claiming other benefits, asylum seekers and those with children eligible for DLA), but this is not 
possible for all of the groups.22
For these groups, wrongly assuming that they were affected by the LPPC would mean that a DiD 
estimate would underestimate the true impact of the LPPC (this is a standard result where a 
measurement error in the treatment variable leads to attenuation bias). How substantial this bias is 
will depend on what fraction of lone parents are exempted and where this cannot be deduced from 
administrative data. 
Carrying out an IA will also require researchers to identify the date when a lone parent would have 
lost their entitlement to IS, based on data available to the researchers. As discussed in Section 2.1, 
the actual date will depend on the age and date of birth of their youngest child and, in some cases, 
on the date their WFI is due. 
To identify the affected population, it is absolutely crucial for this IA that age of youngest child is 
recorded accurately in the WPLS. 
Even if the date of birth of the youngest child can be recorded accurately, identifying the date when 
a lone parent would have lost their entitlement to IS is more complicated for those who lose their 
entitlement to IS after a WFI. Lone parent advisors record each meeting that is booked on the 
Labour Market System, noting its type and whether the meeting was actually attended. This data 
can be merged in to the WPLS, which would make it possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of 
when the next WFI for a particular lone parent was due. This is, of course, dependent on the WFI 
regime being implemented as it is intended, and on all lone parents having WFI dates recorded 
accurately. 
One concern here relates to lone parents who are given a four week extension to their IS claim 
because of problems processing their CTC claim. (This would only be relevant to IS claims that have 
been ongoing since before 2004 and where lone parents were having this support paid as child 
additions to IS.) It appears that these cases will not be identified in the administrative data, and 
this will, therefore, create some inaccuracy in determining when a lone parent was affected by the 
LPPC. As discussed above, this may lead to the DiD estimate of the LPPC being lower than the actual 
impact through an attenuation bias.
Finally, a related problem would arise if lone parents are not moved off IS precisely when they 
ought to be according to the rules (summarised in Appendix B). If these rules are not adhered to in 
practice, then this will lead to errors in determining when lone parents are actually affected by the 
22 Obviously, we would identify them if they remained on IS after they would otherwise have 
been forced to leave it had the exemption not existed. But this technique would not identify 
otherwise identical lone parents in the comparison group, or those observed before the policy 
came into effect, as would be required to perform a consistent DiD analysis. One possibility 
would be to perform a Bloom adjustment (Bloom, 1984), where the impact estimates are 
divided by the proportion of lone parents who are actually affected by the LPPC. But this 
requires us to know the proportion of lone parents who are exempted, which we have already 
said is not possible using the data available to researchers. Therefore, it does not seem likely 
that this approach is feasible. 
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reform. One way to view this is that it is another form of measurement error, and would, as above, 
lead to the DiD estimate of the LPPC being lower than the actual impact through an attenuation 
bias. Alternatively, the DID estimate can be thought of as estimating the impact of an ‘intention to 
treat’ (ITT): that means that it estimates the intended impact of the LPPCs, but acknowledges that 
the policy is not always implemented precisely as intended. 
Finally, analysis done on datasets other than the WPLS could be more problematic. Other datasets 
do not tend to publish children’s dates of birth (to reduce the risk of individuals being identified), 
and there is no other source of data on WFI dates. This means that analysis on these datasets will 
probably need to use age of youngest child measured in years as a cruder indicator of which lone 
parents were directly affected by the LPPCs. 
5.6 Summary
• Two groups of lone parents are directly affected by the LPPC: those receiving IS who lose 
entitlement to it sooner than they would have done otherwise, and those who are no longer 
entitled to claim IS. Furthermore, all may be affected by general equilibrium effects, such as 
substitution, displacement or other spillover effects. 
• For the first group, administrative data can be used to measure outcomes relating to benefits 
and, if tax credit data is of sufficient quality, work outcomes. If information on earnings and tax 
credit payments were made available within the WPLS, then administrative data could be used to 
partially estimate the effect of the LPPC on family income. This would not be sufficient to estimate 
the effect of the LPPC on child poverty as currently defined, however. 
• The WPLS may be able to be used to estimate the impact of the LPPC on repeat claimants, but 
cannot, through its nature, be used to estimate the impact of the LPPC on new customers. 
• The impact of the LPPC on benefit, work, income and poverty outcomes could also be measured 
using household surveys, such as the LFS and FRS, if administrative data on these was of low 
quality or unavailable. However, small sample sizes would mean that impacts would have to be 
large in order to be detected reliably.
• It would not be possible for an IA to separate out the effects of the different elements of the LPPC, 
or examine displacement or substitution effects on the population as a whole. This is because of 
methodological barriers rather than inadequacies of the available data. 
• Provided the date of birth of the youngest child based on Child Benefit records can be recorded 
accurately in the WPLS, it should be possible to replicate in the WPLS the rules for when lone 
parents lose their IS entitlement with a reasonable degree of accuracy, and so any loss of 
accuracy should be minimal. Other datasets will necessarily be less accurate in determining 
precisely when a lone parent lost entitlement to IS.
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6 Potential confounding  
 factors
This chapter discusses technical or methodological problems that could affect an eventual impact 
assessment (IA). Where possible, it suggests modifications to the basic empirical strategy, outlined 
in Chapter 3, that would help to overcome these problems. Section 6.1 discusses how to deal with 
anticipation effects and Section 6.2 discusses how an IA could deal with other policy changes (both 
those that have taken place since 2008, and those that might happen in the future).
6.1 Anticipation effects
‘Anticipation effects’ refer to a situation where a lone parent changes their behaviour because they 
expect to be affected by a policy change in the future
Section 2.2 argued that the lone parent policy change (LPPC) should be thought of as starting to 
affect a lone parent 12 months before the loss of Income Support (IS) entitlement. This means that 
any changes in behaviour occurring in those 12 months would be considered as a response to the 
LPPC. However, there may be anticipation effects to the LPPC before this point if lone parents are 
aware of the loss of IS entitlement before they have their first Final Year Quaterly Work Focused 
Interview (FYQWFI). If an IA failed to allow for these effects, it would bias the estimated impact of 
the LPPC based on a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimate in two ways:
• the DiD estimate would not capture some of the genuine impact of the LPPC (i.e. be biased 
downwards);
• the anticipation effects would alter the composition of the treatment group, and this would 
mean that a DiD estimate would be capturing the impact of the LPPC and any change in the 
characteristics of the lone parents caused by these anticipation effects (see also Chapter 4).
It would be possible for the eventual IA to check whether there are anticipation effects earlier than 
12 months before the loss of IS entitlement. This could be done straightforwardly by changing the 
date at which it is considered the LPPC first affects a lone parent. For example, if it were suspected 
that lone parents knew about the future loss of entitlement to IS and would alter their behaviour as 
a result, up to 24 months before losing that entitlement, then the IA could define the lone parents 
who are 24 months (rather than 12 months) away from losing eligibility to IS as ‘directly affected 
by the LPPC and already receiving IS’. This would mean that the IA accounted for any effect of the 
policy in the period between one and two years before IS eligibility was removed. As a consequence 
of this, the comparison group would have to be re-chosen (so that their youngest children were a 
further 12 months younger); Appendix C makes this explicit for the roll-out stage  
of LPPC.
In general, it is impossible to be sure that one has gone back far enough to eliminate the possibility 
of any anticipation effects before that time, although it might be possible to argue for some of the 
first phases that there could be no anticipation effects earlier than a certain date (for example, 
although the Government announced its desire to make this change in 200723, there was little 
publicity until the policy actually started in November 200824).
23 See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolpda/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_6904000/6904520.stm
24 See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolpda/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_7742000/7742714.stm
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6.2 Other policies
This section discusses relevant changes to policy which took place just before, or during, the period 
over which the LPPC was being rolled out, or which may take place in the near future. 
In general terms, other policy changes will confound an IA if they affect the treatment and 
comparison groups differently. In such a case, the ‘common trends’ assumption underpinning the 
DiD methodology would not hold (as trends in the outcomes of the treatment and comparison 
groups would be different in the absence of the LPPC as a result of these other policies). Therefore, 
in general, other policy changes need to be accounted for in any IA. Broadly speaking, there are two 
ways in which this can be done:
• if the effect of these policies is the same on the treatment and comparison groups, ignoring the 
existence of these policies would not bias the estimates in the DiD model or duration model.  
In this case the additional policies form part of the common trends affecting both groups and  
so do not invalidate the DiD estimator (see Section 3.3);
• if the effect of these policies on the treatment group is not identical to that of the comparison 
group, then the policies can be modelled explicitly in a DiD regression or duration model by 
including an additional explanatory variable which indicated those lone parents who were 
affected by this additional policy. Note that this would only work if there was some variation in 
who was affected in both the treatment and the comparison groups (i.e. some lone parents in 
both the treatment and the comparison groups would have to be unaffected by this policy). This 
approach would, therefore, work for policies that are going to be piloted in certain areas or made 
available to selected lone parents receiving IS or Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), but not for those 
that will be immediately available across the whole country. It also requires that the effect of the 
LPPC does not vary systematically by area. 
Neither of these techniques will work, though, if a policy is introduced which affects only lone 
parents with younger children, and is introduced in all areas of the country at the same time. In this 
case, the DiD estimator cannot be used to estimate the effect of the LPPC, as the comparison group 
will be affected by something that does not affect the treatment group, violating the common 
trends assumption. The DiD estimator would then be estimating the net effect of the LPPC minus 
the effect of the other policy. The most obvious example of this is if LPPC is extended to lone parents 
with children aged five to seven.
The rest of this section discusses some particular other policies in more detail. 
6.2.1 Policies which have already taken effect 
JSA	and	Flexible	New	Deal
In April 2009, the JSA regime changed, with a policy known as Flexible New Deal (FND), which 
affected the support available to all JSA customers. This initially applied in certain Jobcentre Plus 
districts, with the remaining districts affected from April 2010. 
A simple way to reflect this would be to add an additional explanatory variable to the DiD or 
duration model to indicate which lone parents were subject to FND. Such a framework could 
potentially estimate both the impact of the LPPC and the additional impact of FND. This would 
essentially be a DiD evaluation of FND involving the districts not initially operating FND as 
comparison areas. 
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However, if it were thought that FND alters the nature of the LPPC, then it should be possible to 
estimate the impact of the LPPC separately in the FND areas, thus giving two separate estimates 
of the effect of the LPPC, depending on whether it is in operation in conjunction with the FND. 
Obviously, this could only be done in the period where some Jobcentre Plus districts were not 
operating FND, and so it would not be able to estimate medium- to long-run outcomes. 
It is planned that a new Work Programme will be in place nationally by summer 2011 and FND will 
be phased out and folded into the Work Programme.
Employment	and	Support	Allowance
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) replaced Incapacity Benefit (IB) for new claimants from 
October 2008, just before the LPPC began.
It will not be possible to identify separately the impact of ESA from that of removing the entitlement 
to IS, because there will not be any lone parents who had entitlement to IS removed before their 
youngest child is 16 before ESA replaced IB for new claimants. A separate problem arises from the 
fact that the disability conditions for claiming ESA are stricter than those for IB, which meant that 
lone parents on IS with a work-limiting disability facing withdrawal of their entitlement had an 
incentive to start an IB claim before IB was closed to new claimants in October 2008 (rather than 
wait until the end of their IS entitlement and make an ESA claim, which might be rejected). This 
would be an anticipation effect of the LPPC that occurred quite a long time before the withdrawal 
of IS entitlement in some cases. As stated in Section 6.1, moving the effective start date of the 
programme further before the reform would allow for these effects to be taken into account. 
In-Work	Credit	roll-out	
In-Work Credit (IWC), a payment of £40 a week (£60 in London) for the first year of work for 
lone parents who have previously been receiving IS or JSA for at least a year, has been available 
nationally since April 2008. It was previously available in certain Jobcentre Plus districts, covering 
around 45 per cent of lone parents receiving IS. Therefore, this change only affects lone parents in 
districts that did not previously have IWC. 
The extension of IWC affects both the treatment and comparison groups, so failing to account for 
this would lead to the DiD approach estimating the impact of the LPPC plus any differential impact 
of IWC on the treatment group relative to the comparison group. However, as with FND, adding 
an additional explanatory variable to the DiD or duration model to indicate which lone parents are 
potentially eligible to IWC (i.e. those who have been on benefit for at least a year and are living in a 
pilot area prior to April 2008 or anywhere from April 2008, working 16 hours or more a week) would 
give correct estimated impacts of the LPPC, and of the national roll-out of IWC. 
Child	poverty	pilots
Ending	child	poverty:	everybody’s	business, published alongside the Budget report 2008, announced 
the details of a suite of pilots to develop new ways to tackle child poverty.25 These pilots are aimed 
more at reducing child poverty rather than increasing lone parent employment, although policies 
such as improving childcare provision affect both. However, any IA ought to take account of these 
policies to avoid a situation where effects of the child poverty pilots are wrongly attributed by 
the DiD method to the LPPC. As with FND and the national roll-out of IWC, this can be done very 
simply by adding additional explanatory variables to indicate which lone parents live in these local 
25 HM Treasury (2008). Ending	child	poverty:	everybody’s	business. London: The Stationery Office, 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud08_childpoverty_1310.pdf
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authorities at a time when these pilots were running; doing this would allow the DiD model to 
estimate correctly the impact of the LPPC and estimate separately both the impact of the child 
poverty pilots on lone parents receiving IS. 
6.2.2 Policies which have yet to take effect 
The	Work	Programme
At the time of writing, it is planned that a new Work Programme will be in place nationally by 
summer 2011. The Work Programme will replace the FND. It will support a range of customers 
and will be more personalised, with the support supplied being determined by the needs of the 
individual. 
In the context of an IA of the LPPC, the Work Programme is best thought of as a change to the 
treatment: rather than JSA and FND, lone parents who claim JSA will experience JSA and the Work 
Programme. One approach would be for an eventual IA to stop analysing data at the point at 
which the Work Programme begins; this would curtail the ability of an eventual IA to examine the 
medium- to long-run impact of LPPC on lone parents with children aged over seven. Alternatively, 
an eventual IA could take account of this by estimating separate impacts of LPPC before and after 
the Work Programme (something which will be easier to do if the Work Programme is rolled out 
geographically in stages). 
Extension	of	LPPC	to	lone	parents	whose	youngest	child	is	aged	five	and	over
In the Emergency Budget in June 2010, the Government announced its intention to extend the LPPC 
to lone parents whose youngest child is aged five and six. This is expected to be introduced in early 
2012. Because this affects the proposed comparison group, this policy, if implemented, will have a 
substantial impact on any IA of LPPC. 
As details of this proposed extension are unclear at the time of writing, it is not possible to say 
definitively what impact it would have on an eventual IA. But there are three broad approaches 
(two of which are similar to the options discussed above for dealing with the Work Programme). 
First, an eventual IA could stop examining data at the point at which the LPPC was extended (or, 
if anticipation effects are suspected, an earlier point at which it is suspected lone parents with 
children under seven started to alter their behaviour significantly). This would curtail the ability of 
an eventual IA to examine the medium- to long-run impact of LPPC on lone parents with children 
aged seven and over. Second, an eventual IA could use lone parents with even younger children as 
the comparison group, such as those whose youngest children were aged under 36 months. Third, 
an eventual IA could decide to stop estimating the impact of LPPC for lone parents whose youngest 
child was aged seven or more at the time when it was extended to those aged five and six, and 
instead estimate the impact of LPPC for lone parents whose youngest child was aged five and six 
using lone parents whose youngest child was aged seven or more as the comparison group; in other 
words, the definition of the treatment group and comparison groups would be flipped. This would 
be a reasonable thing to do provided that the policy regime for lone parents whose youngest child 
was aged seven or more was relatively stable at that time: the key assumption required for this to be 
appropriate would be that the impact of LPPC on lone parents whose youngest child was aged seven 
or more was stable during the time when it was extended to those whose youngest child was aged 
five and six.
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6.3 Summary
There are several potential confounding factors that could affect various parts of an eventual IA. In 
particular:
• anticipation effects can be dealt with by changing the effective start date of the programme 
in the model. The drawback is that this increases the differences in ages of the children in the 
treatment and comparison groups, making the common trends assumption underlying the 
difference-in-difference approach less plausible;
• other policy changes affecting lone parents on IS and JSA have been introduced since 2008.  
Most of these can be controlled for relatively easily by introducing additional explanatory variables 
which identify those lone parents who are affected. By accounting for many of these policy 
changes, the eventual IA of the LPPC will also provide estimates (based on DiD) of the impact 
of these policies on lone parents on IS. However, some programmes that affect all lone parents 
cannot be controlled for in this way: any IA would have to assume that lone parents are affected 
by the same amount by these reforms (which would mean that any impact of these reforms are 
incorporated in the common trend affecting all lone parents).
• some likely future policy changes – such as the introduction of the Work Programme – will have 
more significant implications for an eventual IA: the Work Programme will, in principle, change the 
nature of the policy regime for lone parents on JSA, and an extension of the LPPC to lone parents 
with younger children will directly affect the proposed comparison group. The most robust option 
would be to stop examining data when the Work Programme starts or LPPC is extended to more 
lone parents, but this would curtail the ability of an eventual IA to examine the medium- to long-
run impact of LPPC on lone parents with children aged seven and over. An alternative approach 
that deals with the Work Programme would be to estimate separate impacts of LPPC before and 
after the Work Programme. Alternative approaches that deal with the extension of LPPC would 
be to use lone parents with children aged under three as the comparison group, or to flip the 
definition of the treatment group and comparison group, using the lone parents whose youngest 
child is aged seven or over to estimate the impact of the LPPC on those whose youngest child is 
aged five and six.
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7 Conclusions and  
 recommendations: what is  
 and is not feasible in an  
 impact assessment of the  
 lone parent policy change
This report has investigated the feasibility of undertaking an impact assessment (IA) of the policy 
change known as ‘Lone Parent Obligations and New Services for Lone Parents’ (together called ‘lone 
parent policy change’, or LPPC). 
Any impact assessment of the LPPC will have to overcome many difficulties. Some of these are due 
to its design: the policy is being rolled out very quickly in a uniform way across the country. Some of 
these reflect its timing: it is being rolled out during a recession, and there has not been a comparable 
recession for over 15 years. Some of these reflect the wider policy environment: other policy changes 
took place just before or after LPPC which will affect lone parents receiving Income Support (IS), and 
larger changes are planned for 2011 and 2012. 
However, the research team’s assessment is that an IA for some groups of affected clients and for 
some outcomes is, in principle, feasible using the difference-in-difference (DiD), or trend-adjusted 
DiD, model approach. The main limitations are that an eventual IA will probably be limited to those 
outcomes which can be measured with administrative data (the Work and Pensions Longitudinal 
Study (WPLS)), that any DiD estimator is always subject to a number of untestable assumptions, and 
that it seems unlikely that the DiD approach could reliably detect small impacts (say less than two 
percentage points). 
The rest of this chapter concludes on the form of IA that seems to hold the most promise.
7.1 Empirical methods
The research team’s recommended empirical strategy is to use a DiD approach to examine the 
impact of the LPPC on those lone parents receiving IS who will lose entitlement to it sooner than 
they would have done otherwise. A DiD approach effectively compares the outcomes of lone parents 
directly affected by the LPPC with those of lone parents whose children are sufficiently young so 
that they are not affected; this comparison will then be compared to the difference in outcomes of 
similar groups of lone parents observed before the LPPC. The idea is that differences in outcomes of 
lone parents with differently aged youngest children before the LPPC begins are informative about 
what the differences in outcomes of lone parents with differently aged youngest children would 
have been in the absence of the LPPC. 
The key assumption needed for a DiD estimate to be valid is known as the ‘common trends’ 
assumption. In the case of the LPPC, common trends would fail if the labour market behaviour 
of lone parents with younger children changed in a way which was different from the change in 
the labour market behaviour of lone parents with older children. There is some evidence that the 
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common trends assumption does not always hold during the period from 2001 to 2007, but the 
divergences are usually small, may not be statistically significant, and they could be accounted for  
in an eventual IA with a trend-adjusted DiD model, especially if a long period of pre-programme 
data is used.
Some outcomes, such as the duration on benefit and the number of lone parents starting work, 
could be examined using either a conventional DiD regression or a duration model. However, a DiD 
estimator cannot be used to estimate the effect of the LPPC on work-contingent outcomes such 
as job duration or earnings (assuming suitable data are available) due to dynamic selection bias. A 
duration model, though, offers a promising way of examining these outcomes. 
However, it is becoming increasingly accepted that naïve analysis using the DiD method often over-
states the degree of reliability of the key parameters (or, equivalently, understates the uncertainty), 
by producing estimated standard errors which are too small. The conventional ways of addressing 
this problem (with clustered standard errors) may not be appropriate in the particular case of the 
LPPC; an eventual IA should, therefore, examine the ways in which standard errors can be estimated 
correctly in this situation, but it should be noted that these methods are at the cutting-edge of 
modern econometrics and the literature has not yet come to a consensus. 
7.2 Choice of datasets 
The most promising dataset for an eventual IA is the WPLS, containing administrative data collected 
by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC). 
This dataset has many advantages over survey data: it allows the date on which a lone parent 
loses eligibility for IS to be identified accurately; it is longitudinal, so IS recipients can be followed 
on to other benefits or into work; and it has a large sample of lone parents directly affected by the 
LPPC. It should be possible to use the WPLS to estimate the impact of the LPPC on key benefit and 
employment outcomes, provided the tax credit data in the WPLS is of sufficient quality. There are 
two main downsides to the WPLS compared with survey data: it does not contain any information 
on the lone parents who are deterred (or prevented) from claiming benefits thanks to the LPPC, and 
it does not measure other outcomes which may well be of interest, such as the hourly wage, hours 
worked per week, a comprehensive measure of family income, or any outcome for children. The 
impact of the LPPC on benefit, work, income and poverty outcomes could also be estimated using 
household surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and Family Resources Survey (FRS), but 
small sample sizes would mean it would be unlikely that one could be confident that the LPPC had 
had any impact at all. 
7.3 Detailed implementation issues for an impact assessment
The LPPC includes additional support offered to lone parents in the 12 months before they lose 
entitlement to IS as a lone parent (as well as after they have entered work). For this reason, and 
to allow for anticipation effects in response to the impending loss of entitlement to IS, the date on 
which the policy first affects a lone parent should be considered to be at least 12 months before the 
loss of their entitlement to IS. Longer anticipation effects can be dealt with by changing the effective 
start date of the programme in the model. But there is a three-way trade-off between examining 
outcomes for a longer period of time, allowing for longer anticipation effects, and reducing the 
difference between the treatment and comparison groups in terms of the age of the youngest child. 
For some of the early phases of the roll-out, the difference in ages of the treatment and comparison 
groups will be large. A small difference in ages is desirable to make the common trends assumption 
more plausible, but a larger difference is needed in order to ensure that the comparison group is 
completely unaffected by the programme. 
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There is a 27 month roll-out period between November 2008 and January 2011 before the policy 
reaches a steady-state (although the current Government has announced its intention to extend 
the LPPC to lone parents whose youngest child is aged five and six after this date). In principle, 
different phases of the roll-out and the steady-state can be examined separately. There are different 
problems to contend with when examining the impact of the roll-out and the steady-state policy. 
On balance, the internal validity of estimates based on the roll-out is probably higher than those 
based on the steady-state, but estimates of the roll-out of the LPPC may be different from (and 
therefore, a poor guide to) estimates based on the steady-state. Whether these represent significant 
disadvantages depends on whether there is interest in understanding the impact of the roll-out in 
itself, rather than merely using the estimates from the roll-out as a guide to the likely impact of the 
steady-state policy. For example, the roll-out provides the only opportunity to estimate the impact 
of the LPPCs on lone parents whose youngest child is aged ten or more.
An IA could estimate the size of impacts at a particular point in time relative to when a lone parent 
would have lost entitlement to IS, but cannot give reasons why these impacts occurred. It would 
not be possible for an IA to decompose the effect of the various elements of the LPPC, nor examine 
displacement or substitution effects on the population as a whole. This is because of methodological 
barriers rather than the inadequacies of the available data. 
Other policy changes affected lone parents on IS and JSA at the time Lone Parent Obligations (LPO) 
was introduced. Programmes affecting all lone parents equally can be ignored in an IA: the impact 
of these reforms would be incorporated in the common trend. Other programmes can be controlled 
for relatively easily by introducing additional explanatory variables into the DiD analysis which 
identify those lone parents who are affected. But some likely future policy changes will have more 
significant implications for an eventual IA: the introduction of the Work Programme will, in principle, 
change the nature of the policy regime for lone parents on JSA, and an extension of the LPPC to lone 
parents with younger children will directly affect the proposed comparison group. The most robust 
option would be to stop examining data when the Work Programme starts or LPPC is extended to 
more lone parents, but this would curtail the ability of an eventual IA to examine the medium- to 
long-run impact of LPPC on lone parents with children aged seven and over. An alternative approach 
that deals with the Work Programme would be to estimate separate impacts of LPPC before and 
after the Work Programme begins. Possible alternative approaches that deal with the extension of 
LPPC would be to use lone parents with children aged under three as the comparison group, or to flip 
the definition of the treatment group and comparison group, in order to use the lone parents whose 
youngest child is aged seven or over to estimate the impact of the LPPC on those whose youngest 
child is aged five and six. This will need to be explored when more details are available about the 
introduction and roll-out of these two policies.
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The Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), can tell us about whether, on any given day, an 
individual is:
• receiving any Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) benefit (and details of which one);
• on a DWP programme (such as New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP));
• in work, according to P45/P46 information from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) in  
the WPLS.
It also tells us:
• each individual’s annual income (P14 earnings data); 
• various pieces of information derived from HMRC’s administrative data on tax credits; 
• dates of meetings with personal advisers, such as Work Focused Interviews (WFIs);
• when lone parents were receiving In-Work Credit (IWC).
The information in the WPLS is held as ‘spells’, and so it is possible to construct measures of:
• transitions (i.e. job starts, benefit exits, flows between benefits);
• (job or benefit) durations (although estimating the impact of the lone parent policy changes 
(LPPCs) on durations may sometimes require the issue of dynamic selection bias to be addressed);
• proportions of time spent in a particular state (i.e. in work, on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)).
The following sections give more detail on the different sources of data. 
The IS History File
The research team believes that the eventual IA would have to make use of the IS History File. 
This dataset gives precise details of all of a claimant’s changes in circumstances during an Income 
Support (IS) claim. This would be needed because the information in the National Benefits Database 
(NBD) is not sufficiently detailed for researchers to be able to calculate the date of birth of youngest 
child at all points in time during an IS claim, and this information would be needed to estimate 
when a lone parent would lose eligibility to IS.
Although it has been used in previous impact assessments (IAs) (most recently, Brewer et	al., 2009)), 
further investigation of the quality of these data would be useful before it is used in any eventual IA.
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Employment data
It is suspected that the P6/P46 information of employment in the WPLS provides an inaccurate 
measure of employment. There seem to be two underlying reasons: 
• employment end dates appear to be badly recorded, and so some employment spells appear to 
be ongoing when the actual job has ended;
• not all genuine jobs appear in the WPLS (this is partly because jobs which pay less than the 
personal allowance need not appear in the WPLS). 
For example, the IA of the Lone Parent Pilots26 shows that 30 per cent of lone parents who left IS and 
started an IWC claim do not have a matching job start in the WPLS. 
The WPLS contains administrative data on tax credit receipt, which can, in theory, also be used to 
determine which lone parents are in work on any given day.27 Before it is used in any eventual IA, 
further investigation of the quality of these data would be useful. 
Earnings data
The P14 data in the WPLS contains information on individuals’ annual taxable income for each tax 
year. But its usefulness is limited by the fact that:
• it is only available with a considerable lag from the end of the tax year to which it refers. 
• the data is annual, and it is very difficult to calculate weekly or monthly earnings for an 
employment spell starting mid-way through the tax year. 
An alternative source of data on earnings might be HMRC’s administrative data on tax credits, which 
potentially has a record of pre-tax annual family earnings for each ‘entitlement sub-period’ (that 
is to say, a period when a family’s circumstances in terms of structure and hours worked remains 
constant within a tax year). However, this data may also not be very timely, as tax credit recipients 
are not obliged to keep HMRC informed of changes in annual earnings. Again, further investigation 
into the quality of these data would be useful. 
Income from benefits and tax credits
Amounts of DWP benefits paid to lone parents (including IS, JSA, Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) and IB) can be obtained from the National Benefits Database (NBD). Benefits that 
are administered by local authorities, principally Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, are not 
included in this though, which would limit the ability of an IA to calculate a measure of family 
income. Tax credits are administered by HMRC and administrative data is available to researchers, 
although at present this does not include information on tax credit amounts paid or family income. 
26 Brewer et	al., 2009.
27 The ‘award element history’ dataset contains information on when lone parents were entitled 
to Working Tax Credit and the full-time premium. These identify those who are working 16 or 
more and 30 or more hours a week, respectively. This information could also be obtained from 
the ‘hours worked history’ dataset, although this contains self-reported information which 
may not be reliable.
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However, since this data does not include information on certain non-taxable income and direct tax 
payments, it would not be possible to construct a measure of income that was similar to that used 
by the Government when calculating official poverty statistics. Any assessment of the impact of the 
LPPC on child poverty, therefore, would have to use non-administrative data sources such as the 
Family Resources Survey (FRS). The limitations of this dataset are discussed in Table 4.1.
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Appendix C 
Likely sample sizes for different 
phases of the roll-out by date 
Income Support eligibility is 
withdrawn
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Appendix D 
A formalisation of the regression 
discontinuity design
This appendix builds on the notation introduced in Chapter 3 to formalise the regression 
discontinuity (RD) design.
Starting from the potential outcomes framework outlined in Chapter 3:
 Y
i
 = D
i
Y
1i
 + (1 – D
i
) Y
0i
so that:
 Y
i
 = Y
0i
 + ΔD
i
In this instance, assume that treatment depends on a ‘forcing variable’ x
i
; c is a cut-off above which 
individuals are treated and below which they are not. 
 D
i
 = 1[x
i
 ≥ c]
The idea then is to estimate the treatment effect at the cut-off:
 Δ
SRD
 = E[Y
1i
 – Y
0i 
| X
i
 c]
by:
 lim E[Y
i
 | X
i
 = x] – lim E[Y
i
 | X
i
 = x]
x↓c                                   x↑c
  
Note that the conditional independence (unconfoundedness) assumption – which is necessary for 
regression and matching – will hold trivially (because given the covariates, there is no variation in 
treatment status). However, the ‘common support’ condition is fundamentally violated. Instead, the 
RD design works under a continuity assumption: that E[Y
1i
 | X
i
 = x] and E[Y
0i
 | X
i
 = x] are continuous in 
x (at least in the region of x = c).
Figure D.1 shows a hypothetical example of applying the RD design.
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Figure D.1 An example of the regression discontinuity design
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Lone Parent Obligations (LPO) were introduced in November 2008. Since then, most lone 
parents with a youngest child aged 12 or over lost entitlement to Income Support solely 
on the grounds of being a lone parent. The age of the youngest child was lowered to ten  
in October 2009 and to seven from October 2010. 
This report presents findings from a feasibility study for an impact assessment of LPO.  
It provides evidence on the suitability of a difference-in-difference methodology and the 
use of lone parents with younger children as a comparison group. The report also presents 
the results of analysis carried out to test whether the ‘common trends’ assumption, 
needed for any difference-in-difference estimate to be valid, held between the period 
from 2001 and 2007.
An impact assessment would form part of a programme of evaluation research, using a 
mixed methods approach, to assess the effects of LPO. The evaluation includes in-depth 
interviews with customers and staff, a large-scale survey of customers, as well as analysis 
of in-house and other data sources. It is being carried out by a consortium of independent 
research organisations, led by the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion.
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